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This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of patent
law's "pioneer invention doctrine" in almost two decades. Since
the early 1990s, patent scholars have unanimously reported that
case law favoring so-called "pioneer" patents-i.e., those
disclosing the most revolutionary inventions-is dead letter.
Accordingly, most scholars have ignored the pioneer doctrine
entirely. Those few who have studied it have consistently argued
that the doctrine ought to be raised from the dead and
reintroduced to patent law. This Article refutes scholarly
consensus on both points. First, empirical evidence shows that
the pioneer doctrine is still very much good law, especially at the
district court level where it is routinely applied. In fact, the
pioneer doctrine actually arises in litigation just as frequently as
other issues that receive substantial scholarly attention. Second,
this Article argues that the pioneer doctrine should now be
excised from patent law once and for all, rather than returned to
a place of prominence. Numerous aspects of patent law ensure
that pioneer inventors receive generous patent rights without
additional assistance. Further, the history of innovation strongly
suggests that truly pioneering inventions do not exist. Despite the
notoriety of inventors like Edison and Bell, a close reading of
history shows that virtually all "pioneer" inventions were
independently and contemporaneously invented by multiple
groups working to solve the same known problems. Finally, case
studies from various industries demonstrate that dominant
pioneer patent rights generally stifle rather than promote
innovation because they significantly discourage investment in
the development of next-generation technology.
* @2012 Brian J. Love.
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INTRODUCTION
Hair awry, eyes wild, working like a mad scientist in the dead of
the night. These are just some of the characteristics of the
archetypical heroic inventor, a caricature born from the habits of men
like Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell, who in many ways
embodied (or at least cultivated) this image during their lifetimes.' As
a society, we lionize and mythologize these individuals as the singular
geniuses who made our modern lives possible.2
It should come as no surprise then that U.S. patent law
traditionally favors extraordinary technological advances: "pioneer
1. Edison, for example, abhorred sleep and frequently worked around the clock,
catnapping when necessary, fully dressed on his workbench. See WYN WACHHORST,
THOMAS ALVA EDISON: AN AMERICAN MYTH 37, 45 (1981) (noting Edison's largely
deserved reputation for sleepless marathons, including the infamous "phonograph vigil"
during which Edison apocryphally worked for five days straight to perfect the
phonograph). Always one to "cook up a good story" in the press, Edison also successfully
cultivated an image as the eccentric "Wizard of Menlo Park." See id. at 23, 36, 46 (noting,
for example, press accounts of Edison as "a scientific hermit ... working like an alchemist
of old," and several popular photographs "showing [Edison] in his white smock in a dingy
room full of bottles, flasks, funnels, beakers, and tubing" or "with his shaggy brown-gray
hair standing out at all angles"). Bell also was known for "[h]is tendency to work round
the clock, and to alternate between states of fierce focus on one goal and an inability to
concentrate on anything." CHARLOTTE GRAY, RELUCTANT GENIUS: ALEXANDER
GRAHAM BELL AND THE PASSION FOR INVENTION 114 (2006). Bell likewise cultivated a
mystic image, demonstrating his telephone at sideshow-like "scientific demonstrations"
alongside "clairvoyants, hypnotists, and levitationists." Id. at 155-59.
2. See WACHHORST, supra note 1, at 4-5 (observing that in "American mythology"
Edison is "the perfection of the typical American": Charles Lindbergh, Merlin, Captain
Ahab, Tom Sawyer, Horatio Alger, Benjamin Franklin, Prometheus, and "God himself"
all rolled up into one). In 1922, a New York Times poll named Edison "the greatest living
American"; in 1945, he ranked sixth on a list of the greatest people in world history,
"outranked only by Jesus, FDR, Lincoln, Washington, and General MacArthur." See id. at
5-6. The scientific community itself contributes to this mythology. Every young scientist
"learns his field of study together with the names of the historical figures associated with
its major discoveries." D. LAMB & S.M. EASTON, MULTIPLE DISCOVERY: THE PATTERN
OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 19 (1984) (citing THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION
165 (1977)).
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inventions" in patent parlance.' From the earliest days of the patent
system, courts have rewarded the owners of pioneer inventions with
exceptionally broad claim scope in exchange for their outsized
technological contribution to society.' This "pioneer invention
doctrine," which helped inventors like Edison, Bell, and Marconi turn
their inventions into the technological giants we know today as
General Electric, AT&T, and RCA, has over time influenced many
aspects of patent law,5 not to mention the very history of innovation.
Indeed, the notion that certain inventions should be exalted as
"pioneers"-and the notoriety many such inventions and their
creators have attained-has long shaped the way society views and
values innovation.6
Nonetheless, today most believe the pioneer invention doctrine
is dead letter. Conventional wisdom in the patent literature states that
3. See John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer
Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 37 (1995) ("[L]aypersons and technologists share the
view that pioneer inventions are crucial to the sort of technological advance that the
patent system is designed to encourage. They are the inventions with which we are most
familiar, and those we care most about." (footnote omitted)). Indeed, it is quite intuitive
to extend special rewards, via the patent system or otherwise, to those whose creations
brought radical benefits to society. See Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and
Contribution, in 8 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 111, 115 (Adam B. Jaffe et
al. eds., 2007) (noting that it is intuitive to assume that the patent system generally
undercompensates inventors because "many inventions generate positive externalities,
generally known as spillovers" that might not be reflected in patent rewards). On the
intuitive appeal of extending greater patent rights to pioneer inventors, see Michael J.
Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1989 (2005); Georgia E.
Kralovic, Comment, The Principle of Fair Notice: Is It Prudent Guidance for the Future of
Patent Law?, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 89, 104-05 (1998). Great inventors, of course, also receive
many rewards that have nothing to do with the patent system. During his lifetime, Edison
was rewarded "with countless banquets, prizes, celebrations, expositions, titles, tributes,
medals, monuments, and memorials." WACHHORST, supra note 1, at 5. Others, like
Guglielmo Marconi, William Shockley, Charles Townes, and Jack Kilby, were awarded
the Nobel Prize. See All Nobel Prizes, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/nobel
-prizes/lists/all/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
4. See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898)
(defining a "pioneer" as "a patent covering a function never before performed, a wholly
novel device, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the
progress of the art").
5. In a variety of contexts, especially in the analysis of conflicting patent rights,
patents are labeled as either "pioneers" or "improvements." See infra notes 93-98 and
accompanying text.
6. Even schoolchildren know of great inventors like Edison, Morse, Howe, Bell,
Fulton, Marconi, and the Wright brothers. See, e.g., Mother Necessity, SCHOOLHOUSE
ROCK, http://www.schoolhouserock.tv/Mother.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2012). Society, it
seems, is always looking for the next name to add to this list. See, e.g., Michael Judge, In
Search of the Next Edison, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2010, at W7A.
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the doctrine was killed more than twenty years ago by the Federal
Circuit's opinion in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States
International Trade Commission.' Thus, for decades, most scholars of
the patent system have ignored the pioneer doctrine altogether, and
those few scholars who have examined it have considered only
whether the doctrine ought to be brought back to life and
reintroduced in patent law.
This Article undertakes the first comprehensive examination of
the pioneer doctrine in more than fifteen years and turns this
conventional wisdom on its head. First, Part I shows that the pioneer
doctrine is still very much alive. Both at the Federal Circuit and in
lower courts, patentees routinely invoke the pioneer doctrine to argue
for broadened claim scope. In fact, the doctrine has been raised in
recent years just as frequently as other doctrines that attract
substantial scholarly attention. More importantly, courts have time
and again considered the pioneer status of patented inventions when
applying the doctrine of equivalents and have, in many cases since the
doctrine's supposed death, awarded pioneer status to patents.
Further, there is good reason to believe that the pioneer doctrine
is poised to retake its former place of prominence in patent law.
Much as the last century saw the emergence of complex mechanical
and computerized systems, this century promises to be one of marked
growth in biotechnology.' As the innovation economy begins to
transition away from cumulative, fast-evolving technologies and
toward those that require costly and prolonged periods of
development, scholars have suggested that the pioneer invention
doctrine ought to play a role in incentivizing firms to make the
substantial investment required to bring successful biopharmaceutical
products to market.' Whether and how patent law adapts to this rising
7. 846 F.2d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
8. See BIOTECHNOLOGY STRATEGY COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
GUIDELINES 4 (2002), reprinted in KATHY WILSON PEACOCK, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
GENETIC ENGINEERING 192, 192 (2010) ("The 21st Century is the Life Sciences Century
.); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY: HARNESSING THE GENE AND
REMAKING THE WORLD 1-4 (1998); Hank Greely, Law and the Biosciences, STAN. LAW.,
Spring 2011, at 36, 37 ("It has been said that, as the 20th century was the century of
physics, the 21st will be the century of biology.").
9. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 738 (2004) [hereinafter Burk & Lemiey, Biotechnology]
(suggesting that "rejuvenating the doctrine of pioneer patents" may help "to minimize the
anticommons problems and give inventors sufficient control to induce them to walk the
uncertain path towards commercial development" in the biotechnology industry); Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1683 (2003)
[hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (same); see also John Mills, Three "Non-
2012] 383
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tide of innovation will dictate the effectiveness of the patent system in
the twenty-first century.
Second, while the pioneer doctrine remains among the living, this
Article argues that it should now be interred once and for all. As
discussed in Part II, proponents of the doctrine's resurgence justify
their claim on two principal grounds: that imperfections in the patent
application process deny groundbreaking inventors adequate patent
scope and that extending broad rights to early inventors leads to more
innovation. They are wrong on both counts.
Part III shows that patent doctrine already ensures that
groundbreaking inventions receive remarkably broad patent
protection. By definition, pioneer inventions arise in fields with
limited prior art and, therefore, will generally be protected by broad
patent claims. These claims, moreover, will naturally expand with
time as technical terminology evolves and hindsight bias takes effect.
Further, pioneer inventors can, themselves, expand their claims years
later by filing reissue and continuation applications.
Next, the history of innovation strongly suggests that truly
pioneering inventions exist only in popular imagination. Despite the
fame of inventors like Edison and Bell, the historical record
contradicts the notion that modern technology was largely developed
through the unprecedented efforts of a select few heroic inventors. To
the contrary, virtually all pioneer inventions were independently and
contemporaneously invented by multiple groups working to solve the
same known problems. For every Edison or Bell fondly remembered,
there exist numerous Swans, Brushes, Reises, and Grays of equal
talent whose names and accomplishments are all but lost to history.10
That lone individuals ultimately won the rights to so many of the most
noteworthy inventions-both as a legal matter and in the hearts and
minds of future generations-resulted more from their superior
marketing and political acumen than technological merit or
foresight."
Obvious" Modifications to Simplify and Rein in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 14 FED. CIR.
B.J. 649, 653 (2005) (acknowledging the argument that "in certain areas of new
technology, such as biotechnology" a patentee's "only viable means for bringing an
infringement claim" is to rely on a broad application of the doctrine of equivalents).
10. See infra Part III.B.1.a.
11. Much of Edison's mystique, for example, was the result of sensational press
coverage and masterful advertising. See WACHHORST, supra note 1, at 37, 41, 43-44.
James Watt's successful domination of the steam engine industry in the United Kingdom
would not have been possible without an Act of Parliament extending his patent rights,
originally granted in January 1769, until 1800. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K.
LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 1, 3 (2008) (linking Watt's term extension
[Vol. 90384
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Finally, history and economic theory predict that dominant
pioneer patent rights stifle far more innovation than they promote.
Simple analysis of licensing negotiations between the owners of
blocking patents demonstrates that early inventors with broad patent
claims will hold up later inventors of improved technology, a fact that
significantly discourages investment in the development of
next-generation products. Numerous industry case studies support
this analysis. Throughout history, dominant pioneer firms have
consistently worked to suppress, rather than create, superior new
products.
Importantly, this result holds true across industries, including the
pharmaceutical and biotech sectors. While the pioneer doctrine
makes the most intuitive sense in fields where innovation is risky and
expensive, calls for enhanced protection of biopharmaceuticals
generally overstate the true cost of product development in the
industry and the role patent law plays in inducing the creation of new
treatments and diagnostics. Pharmaceutical and biomedical research,
despite its nominally high cost, is heavily subsidized by the
government and is often sparked by the unpatentable discoveries of
university researchers working in the pure sciences. Indeed, broad
swaths of medical research have already been claimed by university-
affiliated firms that have proven more successful at extracting steep
royalties than developing treatments and diagnostics.
At their core, these findings and the analysis that follows expose
many fundamental pillars of the patent system as gross
oversimplifications with little or no empirical basis. Modern
innovation is emphatically not the result of singular strokes of genius.
Dominant pioneer firms do not in practice work diligently to develop
their inventions and greater patent rewards do not always incentivize
greater inventive output. To the extent these popular notions of
invention were ever accurate, the pioneer doctrine should be seen as
a relic of that era whose departure from the present is long overdue.
I. THE PIONEER INVENTION DOCTRINE
From the earliest days of the U.S. patent system, courts have
generously interpreted the scope of patents covering important
inventions. This part summarizes the history of the pioneer invention
to the political connections of Watt's wealthy business partner, Matthew Boulton).
Similarly, Marconi's ability to win broad patent rights covering early radio technology was
likely due in part to his aristocratic family and connections to the likes of Edison and
Andrew Carnegie. See id. at 204-05.
3852012]1
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doctrine from its eighteenth century origins to its role in modern
patent infringement litigation and shows that, contrary to
conventional wisdom among patent scholars, courts still routinely
search for pioneer inventions.
A. Determinants of Patent Scope
The scope of protection a patent affords its owner-that is, the
breadth of her right to exclude rivals from making or using certain
technology-is the result of a long-running and complex sequence of
events that begins when an inventor applies for patent protection. To
obtain a patent in the United States, an inventor must file an
application with the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") showing
that her invention is novel,12 useful, 3 and non-obvious.14 She must
also describe her invention with specificity sufficient to enable others
with knowledge of the relevant art to make and use the invention."
Modern patent applications have two distinct parts: first, a
"'specification" in which the applicant describes her invention in
technical terms and, second, a set of one or more "claims" in which
the applicant defines the scope of her invention in legal terms.'6 A
patent applicant is free to draft her claims as broadly as she believes
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). The America Invents Act amends 35 U.S.C. § 102 to
establish a first-to-file patent system in which the first inventor to file a patent application
will win rights to the invention. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285-87 (2011). This provision will go into effect eighteen months
after September 16, 2011, the date the Act was enacted. See § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
14. See § 103. The America Invents Act makes conforming changes to § 103 based on
the first-to-file regime, providing that a patent will not issue "if the claimed invention as a
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention."
§ 3(c), 125 Stat. at 287. Like the revisions to § 102, these changes to the obviousness
standard will not take effect until eighteen months after September 16, 2011. See § 3(n)(1),
125 Stat. at 293.
Though not expressly required by statute, courts have also long held that certain
discoveries are not patentable, namely discoveries of "laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas." See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). Thus, as a practical matter, there is also a fourth
"patentable subject matter" requirement.
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention ... in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."). The America Invents Act
makes minor, conforming changes to § 112. See § 4(c), 125 Stat. at 296. These changes go
into effect one year from the date the Act was enacted, September 16, 2011. § 4(e), 125
Stat. at 297.
16. See § 112 ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or joint inventor
regards as the invention.").
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possible, subject to the limitations of the novelty, non-obviousness,
and enablement requirements. Claims so broad that they cover
existing technology-i.e., the "prior art"-are unpatentable because
they fail the novelty requirement.17 Claims that merely cover obvious
modifications to the prior art are likewise invalid." And, claims
drafted so broadly that they cover novel technology beyond what the
applicant described in her specification are invalid for "lack of
enablement."19
At the PTO, a patent examiner is assigned to review each patent
application for compliance with these requirements. Examiners locate
prior art relevant to the invention disclosed in the application,
compare that art with the applicant's claims, and reject any claims
they believe to be overbroad.20 An applicant may then narrow her
rejected claims and resubmit them for subsequent rounds of
consideration.2 1 This back-and-forth process may run through
multiple iterations before the examiner deems any claims
patentable.22
Though a patent's claims are usually fixed as of the date the
patent issues, the effective scope of those claims is unlikely to be
17. See, e.g., Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (holding that a claim is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 if "each and every element as
set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art
reference").
18. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (holding that
obviousness is to be determined by coinparing "differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue").
19. See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[T]o be enabling, the
specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full
scope of the claimed invention without 'undue experimentation.' ").
20. See, e.g., Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 182-84 (2007) (describing this process in greater detail).
21. Id. at 184. As discussed infra, an applicant may continue prosecuting a family of
patent applications until the term of protection for her initial application expires. See infra
notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
22. On average, patent applications spend about three years in prosecution. See John
R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 98 (2002) (finding that patents issued between 1996 and 1998
spent an average of 2.77 years in prosecution). Many spend considerably longer. See Mark
A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV.
63, 121-23 (2004) (finding that more than 13,000 patent applications spent ten years or
longer in prosecution between 1976 and 2000). Taking continuation applications into
account, the PTO grants patents to more than seventy percent of applicants. Mark A.
Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 192-
93 (2008) (examining nearly 10,000 patent applications filed in January 2001).
23. In rare cases a patentee may apply within two years to have his patent "reissued"
with new, broader claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006); see also infra notes 164-68 and
accompanying text (describing the process of patent reissuance in greater detail).
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clear until after the patent's owner, or "patentee," files suit to assert
his rights against an alleged infringer-i.e., another entity making or
using her invention without permission. A patentee can allege that an
accused infringer's product or process infringes her patent rights in
two ways. First, she can allege that the infringer's technology
"literally" infringes her patent by falling within the express language
of one of the patent's claims.2 4 Because patentees and alleged
infringers rarely agree about the literal scope of patent claims,25
courts typically reserve judgment about literal infringement until after
issuing a Markman ruling defining disputed claim terms or phrases.26
Accused infringers who escape a finding of literal infringement
may still be held liable for infringement by "equivalents." Under
longstanding precedent known as the "doctrine of equivalents,"
accused technology falling outside the literal scope of a patentee's
claims will nevertheless infringe the patentee's rights if it "performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result." 27
24. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997)
(distinguishing between accused devices that "literally infringe upon the express terms of a
patent claim" and those that infringe under "the 'doctrine of equivalents' ").
25. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 2005, at 75, 85 ("The meaning of patent claim terms-called 'claim
construction'-is hotly debated in virtually every patent case, and courts have found
ambiguity even in such innocuous terms as 'a,' 'or,' 'to' and 'when.' ").
26. These rulings are named after Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
370 (1996), the case in which the Supreme Court first held that claim interpretation is a
question of law reserved to courts. See id. at 372.
27. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Claims brought under the doctrine of equivalents are substantially less
successful than claims for literal infringement. Compare John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955,
963, 967 (2007) (finding that, between May 1999 and August 2005, patentees proved
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in approximately seven percent of cases in
which the issue was raised), with ARON LEVKO, VINCENT TORRES & JOSEPH
TEELUCKSINGH, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK: 2008 PATENT
LITIGATION STUDY: DAMAGES AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES AND TIME-TO-TRIAL 8 &
fig.5A (2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/forensic-services/assets/2008
patent_1itigation-study.pdf (finding that, between 1995 and 2007, patentees won thirty-
seven percent of the time in cases decided on summary judgment or at trial). Also, in rare
cases, courts will excuse infringement-even literal infringement-under the so-called
"reverse" doctrine of equivalents because the infringing device is "so far changed in
principle that it performs in a substantially different way and is not therefore an
appropriation." SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (en banc) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
388 [Vol. 90
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Courts enjoy considerable discretion in determining what range
of equivalents fall within a patentee's rights' and, traditionally, have
exercised this discretion in relation to the importance of the patented
invention. When a patent covers only a mere improvement to the
prior art, courts generally afford the patent a very narrow range of
equivalents, thereby limiting the patentee's rights essentially to her
literal claims.29 Conversely, when courts have found that a patent is a
pioneer-that is, a "patent covering a function never before
performed, a wholly novel device, or one of such novelty and
importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art"-
courts customarily reward the inventor with a broad range of
equivalents, thereby permitting her to claim ownership of technology
lying substantially beyond the literal scope of her claims.30 Though
many pioneer inventions have been recognized over the years,1
courts have consistently held that the "[m]ost conspicuous examples
of such patents are: The one to Howe of the sewing machine; to
Morse of the electrical telegraph; and to Bell of the telephone."32
B. "Pioneer" Patents and the Doctrine of Equivalents
While the notion that certain patents qualify as pioneers has
most recently been applied to expand claim scope as part of the
doctrine of equivalents, precedent favoring pioneer inventions dates
back to the founding of the U.S. patent system, well before the
doctrine of equivalents or patent claims existed.
Early versions of the U.S. Patent Act did not require inventors to
define their inventions using a set of claims." Instead, inventors were
only required to provide a "specification ... to distinguish the
28. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 841-42 (1990) (explaining that patent law principles leave
courts "considerable room for discretion"); Thomas, supra note 3, at 44 ("Courts
employing the doctrine of equivalents face a policy choice when considering the range of
equivalents that should be granted to patent holders.").
29. See, e.g., Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
30. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898). Over the
years, courts have used various terminology to describe pioneer patents. See Thomas,
supra note 3, at 48 ("Courts have considered an invention to be a pioneer when it presents
a 'broad breakthrough,' 'major advance,' or 'basic operational concept'; or is 'broadly
new' or 'devoid of significant prior art.' Pioneer inventions have alternatively been called
primary, basic, generic, original, or key inventions." (footnotes omitted)); see also Am.
Stainless Steel Co. v. Ludlum Steel Co., 290 F. 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1923) (referring to
pioneers as patents leading to the "development of a new branch of industry").
31. See infra note 57.
32. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 562.
33. See U.S. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321-22 (rpealed 1836); U.S.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110-11 (repealed 1793).
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invention or discovery from other things before known and used."3 4
During this period, patents were said to cover all "substantially
similar" technology operating under the same "principle."35
Litigation, therefore, required courts to distill the principle of the
invention-at-issue from the inventor's disclosure. 6 In early cases,
courts set patent scope in relation to the importance of the invention,
holding that patents merely improving existing technology were
narrow in principle" while patents on wholly new technology were
broad.38
The gradual introduction of patent claims during the first half of
the nineteenth century initially did little to alter this principle-based
infringement analysis." During this era of "central claiming," patent
claims were viewed as merely drawing attention to what the inventor
viewed as the central principles of his invention. As before, courts
allowed patent rights to stretch in relation to the degree of the
34. U.S. Patent Act of 1790 § 2.
35. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342 (1853); Evans v. Eaton, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 361 (1822) ("[I]f the two machines be substantially the same, and
operate in the same manner, to produce the same result, though they may differ in form,
proportions, and utility, they are the same in principle .... "). See generally Joshua D.
Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the Future: Part I
(1790-1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 371 (2005) (examining the early
history of infringement by equivalents).
36. U.S. Patent Act of 1793 § 3 (requiring patentees to "fully explain the principle ...
by which [their invention] may be distinguished from other inventions"); Karl B. Lutz,
Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents (Part 11), 20 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 377, 377-78 (1938).
37. These concepts were initially developed by Justice Joseph Story in several
opinions he wrote while circuit riding. These early cases typically involved challenges to
patent validity, rather than infringement. See, e.g., Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582
(C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) ("If another person invent[s] an improvement on [a
patented] machine, he can entitle himself to a patent for such improvement only .... ");
Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491, 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,971) ("[I]f the
machine, for which the plaintiff obtained a patent, substantially existed before, and the
plaintiff made an improvement only therein, he is entitled to a patent for such
improvement only... .").
38. See Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 430-35 (interpreting a patent in the prior art
broadly to invalidate the patent-in-suit, which the court viewed as a mere improvement).
39. Faced with the often difficult task of determining a patented invention's novel
principle from the specification alone, some courts began to interpret the Patent Act as
requiring inventors to include language in their specifications identifying which aspects of
their invention were novel compared to the prior art. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743,
1767 (2009). Many patent applicants responded to these court rulings by including a
separate statement at the end of their specifications "claiming" their invention's novel
features. Id. This practice was codified in the Patent Act of 1836. U.S. Patent Act of 1836,
ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (requiring patent applicants to "particularly specify and point
out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or
discovery").
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invention's advancement over the existing art. Patents "introduc[ing]
a mode of operation not before employed" enjoyed broad scope,'
while patents disclosing "an improvement ... not founded on any
new discovery" received narrow protection.41
It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that
patent law's focus on discerning inventive principles slowly morphed
into the now familiar two-part infringement inquiry. The Patent Act
of 1870 for the first time required applicants to "particularly point out
and distinctly claim" the novel aspects of their inventions.4 2 By that
time, courts and patentees generally regarded patent claims as
establishing the periphery, rather than the core, of patent rights,43 and
infringement analysis began to focus on the literal scope of claim
language." The notion that the breadth of patent rights was in some
sense an equitable determination survived this transition, however,
and became a second step in the infringement determination, a
precursor to the modern doctrine of equivalents available to pioneer
inventors.45 As the Supreme Court summarized the doctrine in 1889,
This principle is well settled in the patent law, both in this
country and in England. Where an invention is one of a primary
character, and the mechanical functions performed by the
machine are, as a whole, entirely new, all subsequent machines
which employ substantially the same means to accomplish the
same result are infringements, although the subsequent
40. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 339; see also McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 402, 405 (1857) ("If he be the original inventor of the device . .. , he will have a
right to treat as infringers all who make (similar devices] operating on the same principle,
and performing the same functions by analogous means or equivalent combinations
41. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 574 (1863); see also McCormick, 61 U.S. (20
How.) at 405 ("[I]f the invention. claimed be itself but an improvement on a known
machine ... [t]he inventor ... cannot invoke the doctrine of equivalents to suppress all
other improvements which are not mere colorable invasions of the first.").
42. U.S. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26,16 Stat. 198,201.
43. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1770 ("[T]he role of peripheral claiming was
well established by the end of the nineteenth century . . . .").
44. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) ("This distinct and formal claim is
... of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented to
the appellant in this case."); Brooks v. Fiske, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 212, 215 (1853) ("[W]e are
to look at the [specification and drawings] only for the purpose of enabling us correctly to
interpret the claim.").
45. See generally Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future: Part II (1870-1952), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 441 (2005) (detailing the emergence of the modern doctrine of equivalents after the
Patent Act of 1870). The Supreme Court coined the phrase "doctrine of equivalents" in
1857. See McCormick, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 405.
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machine may contain improvements in the separate
mechanisms which go to make up the machine.46
As this quote suggests, the nascent doctrine of equivalents was
available only to pioneer inventions.4 7 If the patentee was not "a
pioneer in the art," he was not "allowed to invoke the doctrine of
equivalents." 48
It was not until decades later, after the turn of the twentieth
century, that the modern doctrine of equivalents began to take shape.
In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.," the
Supreme Court held for the first time that a non-pioneer patent could
benefit from the doctrine of equivalents.o In that case, the Court
applied the doctrine to a patent that, though not a pioneer, was
nonetheless a patent "of high rank."" In the decades that followed,
courts continued to expand the doctrine's application to patents that,
while not pioneers, were deemed sufficiently important to warrant
protection from equivalents.5 2
By 1950, rules favoring pioneer patents had completely
transitioned from the doctrine of equivalents to merely part of the
doctrine of equivalents. In Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products,53 the Supreme Court extended the doctrine of
equivalents to all patents, making clear for the first time that any
patented invention-even "a secondary invention consisting of a
combination of old ingredients"-could be infringed by equivalents.54
In doing so, the Court also cast the doctrine of equivalents in a new
light. Downplaying the doctrine's long history as a protector of only
the most groundbreaking inventions, the Court instead described the
doctrine as a fundamental pillar of the patent system: one without
which an "unscrupulous copyist [making] unimportant and
46. Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889).
47. See, e.g., Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 207 (1894).
48. Id.
49. 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
50. Id. at 415.
51. Id. at 414.
52. See, e.g., Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 39-40 (1929) (applying
the doctrine of equivalents to find infringement of a patent that, while "not a pioneer
patent entitled to a broad range of equivalents," was nonetheless "meritorious and soon
attained a large measure of commercial success").
53. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
54. Id. at 608 ("The doctrine [of equivalents] operates not only in favor of the
patentee of a pioneer or primary invention, but also for the patentee of a secondary
invention consisting of a combination of old ingredients which produce new and useful
results." (citing Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647, 655 (1879))).
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insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent" could make any
patent right "a hollow and useless thing.""
Though the doctrine of equivalents was now more inclusive than
ever, singling out pioneer patents remained an important part of
infringement analysis for the next four decades. No longer required to
determine which patents were eligible for the doctrine of equivalents,
courts retooled the pioneer doctrine for use in determining just how
far they should stretch to find infringement by equivalents. In the
framework that developed, courts categorized litigated patents as
"pioneers" or "improvements" and applied the doctrine of
equivalents liberally to the former and narrowly to the latter. 56 Courts
used this test as a matter of course until the late 1980s, routinely
extending broad claim scope to a diverse collection of pioneer
patents."
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and conferred upon it jurisdiction to hear all appeals raising a
substantial question of patent law." Since that time, the Supreme
Court has largely eschewed patent cases, leaving the development of
patent law to the Federal Circuit.59
55. Id. at 607.
56. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("[W]hile a pioneer invention is entitled to a broad range application of the doctrine
of equivalents, an invention representing only a modest advance over the prior art is given
a more restricted (narrower range) application of the doctrine."). Rather than setting forth
the pioneer/non-pioneer distinction as a binary one, some courts have suggested that all
patents should be afforded an intermediate range of equivalents determined by their
importance, with "pioneers" and "mere improvements" demarcating the end-points of
that continuum. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Cont'l Oil Co. v. Cole, 634 F.2d 188, 198 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981); Price v. Lake Sales
Supply R.M., Inc., 510 F.2d 388, 394 (10th Cir. 1974).
57. See, e.g., Shields v. Halliburton Co., 667 F.2d 1232,1238 (5th Cir. 1982) (a method
of grouting the legs of offshore oil drilling platforms); Swanson v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 1973) (a shopping cart design); Corning Glass Works v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 374 F.2d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 1967) (a method for crystallizing glass into
a ceramic material); Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 561 F. Supp.
512, 522 (E.D. La. 1981) (an amphibious marsh craft); Ronson Corp. v. Maruman of Cal.,
Inc., 224 F. Supp. 479, 481 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (a gas-fueled cigar lighter).
58. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat.
25, 37-39 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1295-1296 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011)).
59. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the
Bar of Patents, 2002 Sup. Cr. REV. 273, 275-77 (2002) (observing that the Supreme
Court's interest in patent law began to wane in the mid-twentieth century and that its
"withdrawal from the field ... bec[alme even more complete afrer [sic] the creation in
1982 of ... the Federal Circuit"); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible
Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (2001) ("The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has become the de facto supreme court of patents."). In
recent years, however, the Supreme Court has begun to reverse this trend. See, e.g., Bilski
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Within just a few years of its creation, the Federal Circuit dealt a
blow to the pioneer doctrine that many believe left the doctrine
mortally wounded. In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States
International Trade Commission,' a three-judge panel of the Federal
Circuit held-seemingly in contradiction of two centuries of case
law-that a patent's " 'pioneer' status does not change the way
infringement is determined.""1 Writing for the panel, Judge Newman
reiterated the court's holding two years prior that Texas Instruments'
handheld calculator patent was a "pioneer,"62 but went on to hold
that
[t]here is not a discontinuous transition from "mere
improvement" to "pioneer" ..... The judicially "liberal" view of
both claim interpretation and equivalency accorded a "pioneer"
invention is not a manifestation of a different legal standard
based on an abstract legal concept denominated "pioneer".
Rather, the "liberal" view flows directly from the relative
sparseness of prior art in nascent fields of technology.6 3
In the wake of Texas Instruments, the pioneer doctrine's
importance plummeted as patentees and courts increasingly began to
view the doctrine as irrelevant. In less than a year, the pioneer
doctrine had transitioned from patent law staple to "ancient
jurisprudence."' Seemingly, the doctrine's long run was over. If any
doubts remained, the Federal Circuit appeared to erase them in 1995
when, sitting en banc, the court applied the doctrine of equivalents in
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co." without
mentioning the pioneer doctrine once."
C. Reports of the Pioneer Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated
Understandably, most believe that the pioneer doctrine's story
ends here. For almost two decades scholars have steadfastly reported
that the pioneer doctrine is no more: that the doctrine "has fallen into
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407
(2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
60. 846 F.2d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 1370.
62. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (agreeing with Texas Instruments that its calculator was "a dramatic advance
deserving pioneer status").
63. Texas Instruments, 846 F.2d at 1370 (citation omitted).
64. Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978,987 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
65. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
66. See id. at 1514-29. As discussed in infra note 74, several members of the court did
mention the doctrine in separate dissenting opinions.
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relative obscurity,"' been "de-emphasized,"68 or is "moribund"69 and
"no longer part of infringement analysis."70 Pointing to Texas
Instruments, a handful of cases reiterating that holding, and the
Federal Circuit's opinion in Hilton Davis,72 these scholars have
written off the pioneer doctrine as a relic of the past and have sought
to examine it only as dead letter that perhaps ought to be brought
back from the doctrinal hereafter.
But, scholarly consensus can be wrong. Despite oft-repeated
assurances of its irrelevance, the pioneer doctrine quietly survived
Texas Instruments and Hilton Davis. Now, more than twenty years
later, the doctrine remains good law in many courtrooms across the
nation and, indeed, may be well positioned for a return to
prominence.
As an initial matter, case law supporting the pioneer doctrine has
never been overruled. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has
67. Ted Baker, Note, Pioneers in Technology: A Proposed System for Classifying and
Rewarding Extraordinary Inventions, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 445 (2003).
68. Id. at 450; see also Mills, supra note 9, at 657 ("Recent decisions analyzing the
doctrine of equivalents, however, have de-emphasized the differences between pioneer
and non-pioneer patents in determining the scope of equivalents.").
69. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 9, at 1656.
70. Esther Steinhauer, Note, Using the Doctrine of Equivalents to Provide Broad
Protection for Pioneer Patents: Limited Protection for Improvement Patents, 12 PACE L.
REV. 491, 508 (1992).
71. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("[T]he 'pioneer' is not a separate class of invention, carrying a unique body of law.");
Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1261 n.7 (Fed. Cir.
1989); In re Certain Doxorubicin and Preparations Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-
300,20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1602, 1608 (May 2, 1991) (Final).
72. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
73. See Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology, supra note 9, at 738 (calling for the pioneer
doctrine to be "rejuvenat[ed]"); Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1796-97 ("Courts
should think expressly about the importance of an invention in defining its scope ..... The
now-moribund 'pioneering patents' doctrine could serve this purpose."); Burk & Lemley,
Policy Levers, supra note 9, at 1683 (same); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1072-73 (1997) ("The
Federal Circuit cast doubt on the status of the doctrine in its 1995 en banc decision in
Hilton Davis, which reformulated the doctrine of equivalents in a way that did not include
the pioneer status of the invention."); Mills, supra note 9, at 653, 657 (observing that
"[frecent decisions analyzing the doctrine of equivalents ... have either excluded any
analysis of whether a patent is a pioneer or have de-emphasized the differences between
pioneer and non-pioneer patents" even though "the need for the doctrine of equivalents
has increased, rather than decreased" in recent decades); Baker, supra note 67, at 445-46
(observing that the pioneer doctrine "has fallen into relative obscurity" and proposing that
the doctrine be reformed to "increase damages for the infringement of ... meritorious
patents"); Steinhauer, supra note 70, at 508, 521-22 (observing that the pioneer doctrine is
"no longer part of the infringement analysis" and proposing reforms that would
reintroduce the distinction between "pioneers and improvements").
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consistently upheld the pioneer doctrine and discussed it favorably as
recently as 1997. While it is true-as scholars have emphasized-that
the Federal Circuit failed to address the pioneer doctrine in Hilton
Davis, 74 the Supreme Court reversed that decision in an opinion that
specifically mentioned on-going "judicial recognition of so-called
'pioneer' patents."7  Purely as a matter of binding authority,
therefore, it is not at all clear that the Federal Circuit was free to
ignore two centuries of precedent supporting the pioneer doctrine in
Texas Instruments.76
Moreover, since Texas Instruments, the Federal Circuit has
hardly taken a consistent stance against the pioneer doctrine. Though
the Federal Circuit last recognized a pioneer patent in 1988, the court
has addressed the pioneer doctrine several times in the intervening
years and has seldom chosen to follow its holding in Texas
Instruments. In a number of cases, the court has reaffirmed
longstanding precedent favoring pioneers. As recently as 2008, the
Federal Circuit noted in Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp.7 7
74. 62 F.3d 1512, 1514-29 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17
(1997). Two dissenting opinions did reference the pioneer doctrine. See id. at 1549
(Lourie, J., dissenting) ("The pioneer status of the invention, not mentioned by the
majority, ... should be part of the [doctrine of equivalents] analysis."); id. at 1568, 1571-
72, 1577 (Nies, J., dissenting) (referring to the pioneer patent doctrine while setting forth
the history of the doctrine of equivalents).
75. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4 (1997).
76. Because the Supreme Court's forays into patent law are few and far between,
Federal Circuit precedent often drifts away from prior Supreme Court holdings over time.
When these precedential gulfs arise, the Supreme Court has been known to overturn
decades of Federal Circuit law. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Commentary, The Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 29 (2007), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi
/106/eisenberg.pdf (noting that in recent years "the Supreme Court has granted certiorari
when it believes the Federal Circuit has departed from the Supreme Court's own patent
law decisions" even when those decisions were "quite old" and of "limit[ed] ... value").
For example, when the Supreme Court recently reviewed the nonobviousness standard in
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), the Court "dusted off its own
venerable case law for guiding principles, largely ignoring twenty-five years of more recent
Federal Circuit decisions." Eisenberg, supra, at 30 (noting that the Court's holding "relied
primarily on six of its own prior opinions" issued between 1851 and 1976 and "did not use
any Federal Circuit decisions as authority for identifying or explaining the errors made by
the Federal Circuit"). Even more recently in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), the
Court blithely cast aside decades of Federal Circuit jurisprudence on the patentability of
business methods. See id. at 3231 ("[N]othing in today's opinion should be read as
endorsing interpretations of [35 U.S.C.] § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has used in the past."); see also ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 9) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(noting that the Supreme Court's Bilski opinion "disagreed with just about everything .. .
the Federal Circuit had said in this arena").
77. 543 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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that past precedent "emphasized that pioneering inventions often ...
result in broader application of the doctrine of equivalents."7  More
importantly, the court has taken pioneer status into account a number
- of times when applying the doctrine of equivalents. In Hoganas AB v.
Dresser Industries, Inc.,7 for example, the court held that the patent-
in-suit was not infringed under the doctrine of equivalents in part
because "[the patented] invention is only a modest advance over [the
prior art], and thus is not entitled to pioneering status or the broad
range of equivalents which normally accompanies that status."s0
Indeed, empirical evidence demonstrates the patent bar's faith in
the pioneer doctrine's continued vitality. Between 2001 and 2010, no
fewer than sixteen patentees asserted on appeal to the Federal Circuit
that a patent-in-suit was a "pioneer" worthy of broad claim
78. Id. at 1371; see also Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc. v. Metaullics Sys. Co.,
56 F. App'x 475, 480 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (non-precedential opinion per FED. CIR. R. 32.1)
(approving a jury instruction stating that "a pioneering invention ... [is] entitled to a
broad or liberal range of equivalents"); Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 287 F.3d 1097, 1105
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Ad-In-Hole, Int'l, Inc. v. Hageman, No. 96-1455, 1997 WL 154003, at *2
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 2, 1997) (non-precedential opinion per FED. CIR. R. 32.1) (noting that "a
pioneer invention is allowed a broader range of equivalents"); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley
Co. 56 F.3d 1538, 1554-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (affirming a reasonable royalty based
in part on the fact that the patent-in-suit was a "pioneer"); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("In applying the doctrine of equivalents, the
fact finder must determine the range of equivalents ... in light of the ... pioneer-
nonpioneer status of the invention . (quoting D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d
1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).
Also, a number of judges have individually supported the doctrine when writing
separate opinions. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting the need to
"demarkfl the boundary between pioneer inventions and patentable improvements");
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1549 (Lourie, J., dissenting) ("The pioneer status of the invention
... should be part of the [doctrine of equivalents] analysis.... Pioneers should be given
more scope of protection than inventors in a crowded art."); Balt. Therapeutic Equip. Co.
v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., Nos. 93-1301, 93-1331, 1994 WL 124022, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
12, 1994) (non-precedential opinion per FED. CIR. R. 32.1) (Rich, J., concurring) ("How
far beyond what is disclosed a court may expand .. . is ... dependent on various factors ...
[including the] pioneer status of the invention as a whole .... ); Int'l Visual Corp. v.
Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Lourie, J. concurring)
("Whether a patent claims a pioneering invention may be a factor favoring the application
of the doctrine [of equivalents]."); Atl. Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d
1299, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)
(considering patentee's claim to a pioneering method in concluding that patentee did not
intend to limit the scope of its claim).
79. 9 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
80. Id. at 954; see also Petrosky v. Nike, Inc., No. 91-1513, 1992 WL 78089, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 21, 1992) (non-precedential opinion per FED. CIR. R. 32.1) (rejecting the
patentee's claim of pioneer status); Extrel FTMS, Inc. v. Bruker Instruments, Inc., Nos.
91-1216, 91-1222, 1992 WL 9869, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 1992) (non-precedential opinion
per FED. CIR. R. 32.1) (same).
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scope"-a figure comparable to the number who have asked the
court to consider such hotly debated topics as the reverse doctrine of
81. Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH & ERBE
USA, Inc. at 40, ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (Nos. 2008-1425, 2008-1426), 2008 WL 4307426 (arguing that "one of skill in the
art" would read more broadly "the claims of a pioneering patent such as the [patent-in-
suit]"); Corrected Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 39, Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE,
Inc., 511 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Nos. 02-1457, 02-1458, 02-1481, 02-1482), 2002 WL
32815095, at *39; Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants the Regents of the University of California,
Abbott Molecular Inc. & Abbott Laboratories Inc. at 44, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Dako A/S, Inc., 517 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2007) (No. 2007-1202), 2007 WL 1573997
(arguing that the patentee was "allowed broad claims" because of "the pioneering
invention first described by the [patents-in-suit]"); Brief of Appellant at 21, Automed
Techs., Inc. v. Knapp Logistics & Automation, Inc., 236 F. App'x 604 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (non-precedential opinion per FED CIR. R. 32.1) (No. 06-1587), 2006 WL 3420475
("When the patent, as in this case, discloses a unique invention that breaks new scientific
ground-a so-called 'pioneer patent'-the patentee enjoys the benefit of broader claims
.. ); Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Monster Cable Products, Inc. at 51-54,
Monster Cable Prods., Inc. v. Quest Grp., 210 F. App'x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (non-
precedential disposition per FED CIR. R. 32.1) (Nos. 06-1111, 06-1112), 2006 WL 1287721
(arguing that the district court erred, by "its misunderstanding of pioneer status," in
denying the patent-in-suit "a pioneer's scope of equivalents"); Corrected Non-
Confidential Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Tritek Technologies, Inc. at 1, 14, Tritek Techs.,
Inc. v. United States, 208 F. App'x 869 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (non-precedential disposition per
FED CIR. R. 32.1) (No. 06-5014), 2006 WL 951953; Brief of Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant-Appellant Kwik Products, Inc. & Counterclaim Defendants-Appellees
Fernando R. Iacona and Ignazio M. lacona at 40-41, Kwik Prods., Inc. v. Nat'l Express,
Inc., 179 F. App'x 34 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (non-precedential disposition per FED CIR. R. 32.1)
(Nos. 05-1319, 05-1343), 2005 WL 1649349, at *40-41; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Arlaine
& Gina Rockey, Inc. at 12, Arlaine & Gina Rockey, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 175 F. App'x 329
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (non-precedential opinion per FED CIR. R. 32.1) (No. 05-1236), 2005 WL
1178098, at *12; Brief and Addendum of Appellant Duane L. Knopik at 50 n.16, Knopik v.
BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 95 F. App'x 332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (non-precedential
opinion per FED CIR. R. 32.1) (Nos. 03-1420, 03-1446), 2003 WL 24028400, at *50 n.16;
Brief of Appellant Pieczenik at 4, Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 76 F. App'x 293 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (non-precedential opinion per FED CIR. R. 32.1) (No. 03-1302); Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants ACTV, Inc. & Hypertv Networks, Inc. at 52, 59, 62, ACTV, Inc. v. Walt
Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1491), 2002 WL 32815102, at *52, *59,
*62; Replacement Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 58, Lopes v. Hardware Distrib., Ltd., 67
F. App'x 604 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (non-precedential opinion per FED CIR. R. 32.1) (No. 02-
1146), 2002 WL 32615445, at *58; Brief for Plaintiff-Cross Appellant Boehringer
Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. (Nonconfidential) at 58, Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc.
v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-1026, 02-1027), 2002 WL
32620050; Corrected Principal Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Laporte Pigments, Inc. &
Chemische Werke Brockhties AG at 69, LaPorte Pigments, Inc. v. Axel J., L.P., 44 F.
App'x 960 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (non-precedential opinion per FED CIR. R. 32.1) (Nos. 01-1226,
01-1227), 2002 WL 32619974, at *69; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 23-30, Plant Genetic
Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1011), 2001
WL 34629700, at *23-30; Appellant's Reply Brief Non-Confidential Version at 14, Leggett
& Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 285 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1255),
2001 WL 34373107, at *14; cf Brief of Amicus Curiae the Ass'n for Competitive
Technology in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee in Favor of Affirmance at 20, TiVo, Inc. v.
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equivalents,' the scope of patentable subject matter, 8 and the entire
market value rule.' In more than forty other appeals during the same
time period, patentees have characterized their patents as "pioneers"
for (at least) the rhetorical support that label provides.'
EchoStar Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (non-precedential opinion per FED
CIR. R. 32.1) (No. 09-1374), 2010 WL 3950032, at *20 ("It is a venerable principle of
patent law that pioneering patents-important patents that open up a new field-should
be entitled to a broader range of protection than more modest inventions or
improvements on existing ideas." (quoting Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 9, at
1656) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brief for Appellee at 57, Symbol Techs., Inc. v.
Lemelson Med., Educ., & Research Found., L.P., 429 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 00-
1583), 2001 WL 34607706 ("A pioneer inventor such as Mr. Lemelson, especially, may
naot fully appreciate the extent of the inventions his disclosure entitles him to claim.");
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Unique Coupons, Inc. at 7, Unique Coupons, Inc. v. Northfield
Corp., 38 F. App'x 578 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (non-precedential disposition per FED CIR. R.
32.1) (No. 01-1425), 2001 WL 36089076, at *7 ("To the contrary-as the district court
held-Unique's inventions were pioneering and broad.").
In many other cases, accused infringers have relied on the pioneer doctrine to
argue that patentees' inventions are mere improvements entitled to few, if any,
equivalents. See, e.g., Corrected Response Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 64-65, Tofasco
of Am., Inc. v. Atico Int'l U.S.A., Inc., 2011 WL 2631818 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (non-
precedential disposition per FED CIR. R. 32.1) (No. 2010-1208), 2010 WL 3048413, at *64-
65; Reply Brief of Appellant at 37, Mitutoyo Corp. v. Central Purchasing, L.L.C., 499 F.3d
1284 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 2006-1312, 2006-1343), 2007 WL 649187; Brief for Appellees
Dey, L.P. & Dey, Inc. at 21, Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 287 F.3d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (No.
01-1374), 2001 WL 34148341.
82. Parties in fourteen appeals raised the reverse doctrine of equivalents between
2001 and 2010. For a list of citations, see Appendix A in Brian J. Love, Appendices for
Interring the Pioneer Doctrine, 1 (Jan. 2, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractjid=1963946. Under the so-called reverse doctrine of equivalents, courts may
permit a particularly important improvement invention to escape an infringement claim
even though it falls within the literal scope of existing patent rights. See Westinghouse v.
Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898) ("The converse [of the doctrine of
equivalents] is equally true. The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his
claims, but if the latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the
patent, literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little
subject to be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a statute has to be
convicted, when he has done nothing in conflict with its spirit and intent.").
83. Parties (or amici) in just twelve appeals raised 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a defense
between 2001 and the time In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008), reached the Federal Circuit in
early 2007. For a list of citations, see Appendix B in Brian J. Love, Appendices for
Interring the Pioneer Doctrine, 2 (Jan. 2, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=1963946. Patentable subject matter has been raised in about twenty cases
post-Bilski. A complete list is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
84. Parties in just over thirty appeals raised the entire market value rule between 2001
and 2010. A complete list is on file with the North Carolina Law Review. The entire
market value rule allows the patentee of a component invention to recover damages based
on the entire value of a complex infringing product incorporating that component. See
Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60
STAN. L. REV. 263, 264 (2007).
85. For a list of citations, see Appendix C in Brian J. Love, Appendices for Interring
the Pioneer Doctrine, 2-5 (Jan. 2, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract
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Lower courts have been even more receptive to patentees'
requests for recognition as "pioneers." Since Texas Instruments, at
least twelve district courts have applied the doctrine of equivalents
more liberally to patents based on their pioneering nature.8 6 Several
id=1963946. Moreover, in a testament to the doctrine's perceived power, even a passing
reference to the "pioneering" nature of the invention-at-issue will frequently drive an
accused infringer to respond, rather than assume the doctrine is moribund. See, e.g., Brief
of Defendants-Cross Appellants Becton, Dickinson & Co. & Nova Biomedical Corp. at 6,
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos.
09-1008, 09-1009, 09-1010, 09-1034, 09-1035, 09-1036, 09-1037), 2009 WL 1208037; Non-
Confidential Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Intervet Inc. at 3, Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617
F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2009-1568), 2010 WL 783528, at *3 ("Merial seeks to
broaden its patent disclosure by portraying the [patent-in-suit] as 'pioneering' .... But in
truth there is nothing pioneering about [it].").
86. Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 95-218-SLR, 1998 WL
151411, at *44 (D. Del. Mar. 13, 1998) ("Given the novel nature of the claimed invention,
the ... patent deserves pioneer patent status."), affd, 228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 1262, 1292 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding
that the invention "disclosed by the [patent-in-suit] was a pioneer invention ... , and is
thus entitled to a broad and liberal application of the doctrine of equivalents" (citation
omitted)), affd in part, modified in part, vacated in part, 163 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Novo Nordisk of N. Am. v. Genentech, No. 94 Civ. 8634 (CBM), 1995 WL 512171, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1995) ("[T]he [patent-in-suit] represents a pioneering contribution ...
[and] [a]s such ... is entitled to a broad construction .... "), vacated, 77 F.3d 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); Pfizer Inc. v. F & S Alloys & Minerals Corp., 856 F. Supp. 808, 815 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Saes Getters, S.p.A. v. Ergenics, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 979, 985 (D.N.J. 1992), affd, 989
F.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1993); B.F. Goodrich FlightSystems, Inc. v. Insight Instruments Corp.,
No. C-2-91-0800, 1992 WL 193112, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 810
(Fed. Cir. 1993); T.A. Pelsue Co. v. Grand Enters., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1476, 1495 (D. Colo.
1991); Stranco, Inc. v. Atlantes Chem. Sys., Inc., No. Civ.A. H-86-26, 1990 WL 10072072,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 31, 1990), affd, 960 F.2d 156 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Read Corp. v. Portec,
Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (D. Del. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 970 F.2d 816 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Loral Corp. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., No. C-3-86-216, 1989 WL 206377, at *8 (S.D.
Ohio 1989), rev'd, 899 F.2d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal
Foam Sys., Inc., No. 83-C-1952, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17582, at *16 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 19,
1988); de Graffenried v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 458, 485 (Cl. Ct. 1990).
Several other courts have ruled that a patent is a "pioneer" and used this
determination for another purpose. See WMS Gaming v. Int'l Game Tech., No. 94-C-3062,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13864, at *6, *45-46 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1996) (declaring the patent-
in-suit "a highly successful, pioneer patent" and suggesting this fact weighed against a
finding of obviousness); cf Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., No. 8:97CV304, 2008 WL
5100730, at *1 (D. Neb. Nov. 26, 2008) (including in a "Joint Stipulation for Entry of Final
Judgment" that "[t]he invention of the [patent-in-suit] is a pioneering invention"); Transco
Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 613, 621 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(assuming for purposes of ruling on an accused infringer's motion for summary judgment
of noninfringement that the patent-in-suit was a pioneer); Pall Corp. v. Micron
Separations, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1298, 1312 (D. Mass. 1992) (noting, but not expressly
relying upon, the fact that the patents-in-suit were "pioneers"), aff'd in part, modified in
part, rev'd in part, 66 F.3d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Otto Zollinger, Inc. v. Qualitex, Inc., No.
84-1630, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 372, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 1989) (same); infra notes 95-
97 (collecting cases where courts have noted whether a patent is a pioneer in assessing
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dozen others have applied the doctrine, but ruled that the patent-in-
suit is not a pioneer." And in dozens more cases, courts have
acknowledged the pioneer doctrine, but declined to reach it by ruling
on other grounds."
These empirical findings show that, contrary to conventional
wisdom in the patent literature, many jurists and attorneys in the
patent bar believe that the pioneer doctrine is alive and well. Indeed,
these findings likely understate the extent to which the pioneer
doctrine remains a viable part of the doctrine of equivalents in four
ways. First, empirical evidence suggests that courts find infringement
by equivalents less frequently today than they ever have. In a recent
study, John Allison and Mark Lemley found that patentees' overall
win rate under the doctrine of equivalents has fallen significantly over
the last two decades.89
Second, there is good reason to believe that relative to prior eras
there are simply fewer "pioneer" candidates among patents granted
today. The number of patents issued each year has almost trebled
royalty damages, deciding whether to grant an injunction, and describing improvement
patents).
87. For examples from the last decade see, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
C.A., No. 03-440 S, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97491, at *20 n.8 (D.R.I. Oct. 19, 2007); Linear
Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., No. C-94-1633 MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96860, at *170-71
(N.D. Cal. June 9, 2006); Chiron Corp. v. SourceCF Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d. 1019, 1034 (N.D.
Cal. 2006); Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. Brainlab Medizinische Computersystems GmbH,
417 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1199-1200 (D. Colo. 2006); Monster Cable Prods., Inc. v. Quest
Grp., No. C-04-0005 MHP, 2005 WL 1875466, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2005); Pro-Tech
Welding & Fabrication, Inc. v. Lajuett, 367 F. Supp. 2d 398, 409-10 (W.D.N.Y. 2005);
Ghaly v. Hasbro, Inc., Nos. 97-CV-7037 (DRH), 98-CV-5239 (DRH), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25980, at *43-45 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
88. For examples from the last decade, see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dako N.
Am., Inc., No. C-05-03955 MHP, 2009 WL 1083446, at *11 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009);
CNET Networks, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc., No. C 06-5378 MHP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66737,
at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2008); Kenall Mfg. Co. v. Genlyte Thomas Grp. L.L.C., 413 F.
Supp. 2d 937, 938 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Halmar Robicon Grp., Inc. v. Toshiba Int'l Corp.,
No. 98-501, 2003 WL 25815131, at *4 n.5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2003).
89. Allison & Lemley, supra note 27, at 963, 966, 978 (finding that prior to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996),
patentees won 40% of all motions and verdicts applying the doctrine of equivalents
compared with just 21.7% between December 2000 and May 2002, and just 22.2%
between February 2004 and August 2005); see also id. at 967 (finding that patentees
proved infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in just 29 of 413 cases in which the
issue was raised between May 1999 and August 2005); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the
Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1157, 1198 (2004) (finding that, in 2002, accused infringers won 123 of 145 reported cases
reaching a final determination on infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
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over the last three decades,' and this. growth has been especially
concentrated in a number of fields, namely computing and complex
electronics.91 This proliferation of patents naturally makes it less
likely that any given patent will qualify as a pioneer. The relative
complexity of modern technology may also make judges less willing
to declare that patented technology they do not fully understand is
"pioneering.""
Third, empirical results can never fully quantify the extent to
which the concept of pioneer patents has influenced many other
aspects of patent law. As the appellate briefs cited above
demonstrate, patentees often seek to characterize their patents as
"pioneers" for reasons that have little to do with extending patent
scope under the doctrine of equivalents. 93 In recent years, self-
proclaimed "pioneer" patentees have asked courts for special
treatment in a number of patent law areas. In 2003, for example, the
Federal Circuit considered but rejected the argument that pioneers
should receive preferential treatment under the enablement
requirement.94 Such attempts have not always been unsuccessful. For
example, a small, but significant line of precedent holds that pioneer
90. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2010, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taflus-stat.htm (last
modified Sept. 7, 2011) (reporting that the number of patents issued per year has increased
from 61,819 in 1980 to 167,349 in 2009 to 219,614 in 2010). The number of patent
applications filed each year has more than quadrupled since 1980. See id. (reporting that
the number of utility patent applications filed per year increased from 104,329 in 1980 to
490,226 in 2010).
91. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 22, at 94 (observing that there was "a sea
change in patenting" between the late 1970s and late 1990s during which "the trend has
been towards patenting in industries considered 'high-tech,' such as software,
semiconductors, computers, and biotechnology").
92. See Karen Feng, Note, Plant Genetic Systems v. DeKalb: The Pioneer Doctrine
Cannot Substitute for Defective Enablement, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 93, 102 (2004) (making a
similar argument).
93. As one commentator has noted, even when courts do not rely on the doctrine,
there is good reason to believe that judges familiar with it "consciously tip the balance in
favor of infringement" when the patentee is arguably worthy of the title "pioneer." See
Samson Vermont, A New Way to Determine Obviousness: Applying the Pioneer Doctrine
to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), 29 AIPLA Q.J. 375, 406 (2001).
94. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1339-42 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). Pioneers have asked for preferential treatment in other cases as well. See
Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Am. Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399, 406 (1905) (suggesting that
pioneer patents should receive liberal claim construction, in addition to liberal treatment
under the doctrine of equivalents); Pfaff v. Wells, 124 F.3d 1429, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(rejecting patentee's argument that courts "should afford greater latitude under the on-
sale bar to an innovative, or pioneer, patent").
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patents are entitled to higher reasonable royalty damages. 95 Another
lowers the bar pioneers must hurdle to obtain an injunction. 96
Further, over- the years, the term "pioneer" has been imported into
other areas of patent law to signify the dominant patent right among
many. For example, courts and scholars discussing blocking patent
rights generally refer to the senior and junior rightsholders as the
"pioneer" and "improver," respectively.' Courts reviewing
challenges to Abbreviated New Drug Applications-which permit
generic drug manufacturers to apply for FDA approval before name
brand manufacturers' patent rights expire-follow a similar
convention, referring to the existing name-brand drug as the
"pioneer.""
95. This case law is almost totally confined to the United States Court of Federal
Claims. See, e.g., Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 771 (Fed. Cl. 1999)
(stopping short of characterizing the patent-at-suit as a "pioneer," but recognizing the
invention as "highly advantageous in comparison to [the prior art]," a finding that
"favored an increase in the negotiated royalty rate" for the patentee); Brunswick Corp. v.
United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 204, 212, 214 (Fed. Cl. 1996) ("The patent at issue is a pioneer
patent, and therefore, there are no exactly comparable patent licenses and royalty rates
from which to draw wisdom."); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 15, 26 (Fed.
Cl. 1996), rev'd, 226 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, it has been applied by district
courts and even implicitly approved by the Federal Circuit. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley
Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming a reasonable royalty based in
part on a finding below that the patent-in-suit was a "pioneer").
96. See Emory Univ. v. Nova BioGenetics, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0141-TWT, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 57642, at *12 (N.D. Ga. 2008) ("[Wjhere a company pioneers an invention in
the marketplace, irreparable harm flows from a competitor's attempts to usurp the
pioneering company's market position and goodwill." (quoting 800 Adept., Inc. v. Murex
Sec. Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 935 F. Supp. 260, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting that the patent-in-suit covers a "pioneering invention" when granting the
patentee's request for a preliminary injunction); Voice Sys. & Servs. v. VMX, Inc., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1106,1107 (N.D. Okla. 1992) (making a similar finding).
97. See, e.g., Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ("A 'blocking patent' is an earlier patent that must be licensed in order to practice a
later patent. This often occurs, for instance, between a pioneer patent and an
improvement patent."); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 79 (1994).
98. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676-77 (1990). One more
example of preferential treatment for inventive "pioneers" comes from outside patent law.
From 1991 to 1997, the FCC applied a "pioneer's preference rule[]" to "extend[]
preferential treatment in the FCC's [wireless spectrum] licensing processes to parties that
demonstrated their responsibility for developing new spectrum-using communications
services and technologies." Pioneer's Preference Program, FCC OFF. OF ENG'G & TECH.,
http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/faqs/pioneerfaqs.html (last updated Jan. 13, 2000); see also In
Matter of Establishment of Procedures to Provide a Preference to Applicants Proposing
an Allocation for New Services, 6 F.C.C. Rcd. 3488, 3494 (1991) (discussing the pioneer
preference).
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Fourth, there is good reason to believe that the pioneer doctrine
may soon rise to its former level of prominence. As described in
greater detail below, since the pioneer doctrine was declared dead in
the patent literature twenty years ago, a number of scholars have
called for the doctrine's revival.99 The most convincing calls for
greater application of the pioneer doctrine have come from scholars
arguing that a strong pioneer doctrine ought to be applied in the
pharmaceutical and biomedical industries where new products
require substantial investment and are long delayed in waiting for
approval from the FDA. 100 If, as many predict, biotechnology replaces
computer technology as the most visible and lucrative area of
innovative growth in the twenty-first century,10' revolutionary
breakthroughs in biomedicine may well rekindle patent law's interest
in the pioneer doctrine.
II. FOR THE PIONEER DOCTRINE
In the literature, presumptions about the pioneer doctrine's
irrelevance in modern patent litigation are invariably followed by
arguments that the doctrine ought to be revived to remedy one of
various perceived inefficiencies in the patent system. As discussed
above, long-held beliefs about the pioneer doctrine's viability proved
to be unfounded. The next two Parts examine the doctrine's benefits
and conclude that the pioneer doctrine has no place in modern patent
law. This part summarizes arguments supporting the pioneer doctrine.
Scholars calling for the doctrine's revival generally fall into one
of three categories.102 One group argues that various aspects of the
patent prosecution system tend to work against inventors of
groundbreaking technology and deny them full protection. Michael
Meurer and Craig Nard, for example, have argued that the pioneer
doctrine ought to be applied to save pioneer inventors from high
"refinement costs"-i.e., costs associated with "identifying and
claiming the broadest patentable set of embodiments enabled by the
disclosure in the patent specification"-namely "legal fees and the
implicit cost of the effort of the inventor and others" to further
99. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
100. See infra note 106.
101. See supra note 8.
102. Courts, on the other hand, have largely been mum on the subject. Thomas, supra
note 3, at 52 ("The courts have offered little justification for the application of the pioneer
invention doctrine."); Vermont, supra note 93, at 403-05 ("The underlying purpose of the
pioneer doctrine is a mystery that courts seldom attempt to solve.").
404 [Vol. 90
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"refine [their] understanding of the invention.""' A second group
argues that the pioneer doctrine increases overall innovation by
encouraging inventors to tackle technological problems so risky that
existing patent rights are an insufficient incentive. Samuel Oddi, for
example, has proposed the creation of a sui generis "Revolutionary
Patent" that would provide incontestable protection to
"extraordinary" inventions for thirty-four years from the patent grant
date as a means to spur growth of the U.S. economy." Finally, a third
group argues that extending broad patent rights to early inventors in
nascent markets increases overall innovation by permitting pioneer
firms to coordinate subsequent research and development
("R&D"). 0 ' Recently, this argument has been embraced by a number
of scholars who believe that a rejuvenated pioneer doctrine might
help clear the proliferation of patents currently hindering
development in the biomedical industry.106
103. Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 1952-55, 1989, 2004.
104. A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention in the Twenty-First Century, 38
AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1098-99, 1128-47 (1989). Oddi, of course, could not have foreseen at
the time that just a few years later the U.S. economy would experience unprecedented
growth due to an explosion in computer and internet technology, most of which was
developed without reliance on patent protection. See infra notes 305-06 and
accompanying text.
Numerous other commentators have written in support of reviving the pioneer
doctrine. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1796-97; Anthony Azure, Note, Festo's
Effect on After-Arising Technology and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 76 WASH. L. REV.
1153, 1181-82 (2001) (arguing that pioneer inventors receive unduly narrow claim scope
under the modern doctrine of equivalents); Baker, supra note 67, at 445-46; Steinhauer,
supra note 70, at 521-22 (arguing that the doctrine of equivalents should be applied to
pioneer patents "as a whole" and to improvement patents on an "element by element"
basis); cf Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Determine
Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 46-47 (1992) (proposing reforms to the doctrine of
equivalents, including limiting "application of the doctrine ... to situations of pioneer
inventions or actual copying, as envisioned in the early trial opinions of Justices Story and
Washington").
105. As discussed in detail below, this line of argument is based on Edmund Kitch's
"prospect theory." See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265-66 (1977).
106. See Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology, supra note 9, at 738 (suggesting that
"rejuvenating the doctrine of pioneer patents" would help "minimize the anticommons
problems and give inventors sufficient control to induce them to walk the uncertain path
towards commercial development" in the biotechnology industry); Burk & Lemley, Policy
Levers, supra note 9, at 1656, 1683 (same); see also Mills, supra note 9, at 653, 657
(suggesting that "[r]ecent decisions ... de-emphasiz[ing] the differences between pioneer
and non-pioneer patents" may hinder innovation because "the doctrine of equivalents
may be the only viable means for bringing an infringement claim in certain areas of new
technology, such as biotechnology"); Faith S. Fillman, Comment, Doctrine of Equivalents:
Is Festo the Right Decision for the Biomedical Industry?, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 493, 529-30
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A. Patent-Drafting Frictions
The first rationale for the pioneer invention doctrine closely
tracks the modern justification for the doctrine of equivalents.
According to this theory, various "frictions" in the patent prosecution
system prevent patentees from receiving claims that literally cover the
full scope of their inventions.o' Among these frictions are (1) the
inherent difficulty of describing a physical invention in words, (2)
patentees' inability to foresee how technology will develop after their
patent issues, and (3) the possibility that in some instances patent
examiners who lack inventors' expertise in cutting-edge technology
will unnecessarily restrict claim scope. o To supporters of the friction
theory, the doctrine of equivalents exists to counteract these frictions
and, thereby, to ensure that patentees are properly rewarded for their
inventive contribution.109 Courts and commentators have extended
this line of argument to support the pioneer invention doctrine on the
basis that it is even more difficult to draft claim language adequately
protecting a new, groundbreaking invention."0
(2002) (arguing that pioneer inventors in the biomedical area are unable to obtain full
claim scope, thereby "provid[ing] minor improvers undeserved protection").
107. Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 1950 ("To the extent that a modern justification
for the doctrine can be inferred, it apparently starts with the belief that . . . sometimes
frictions in the system cause patent claims to be too narrow. The proper role of the
[doctrine of equivalents] is to overcome these frictions and restore the proper breadth.");
see Sarnoff, supra note 89, at 1181-83.
108. See Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 1968-70; Sarnoff, supra note 89, at 1181-83.
109. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)
("If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly
diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat
the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying.");
Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 1968; Joseph S. Cianfrani, Note, An Economic Analysis
of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 30 (1997).
110. Moore v. United States, 211 U.S.P.Q. 800, 806 (Ct. Cl. 1981) ("The doctrine finds
its roots in the judicial recognition that drafting the disclosure and claims for a pioneer
patent is a difficult task because of the new scientific ground being broken by the unique
invention.... [T]he doctrine of equivalents remedies the anomaly in the law that exists
whenever a pioneer patent is not literally infringed by the very subject matter which was
spawned by the disclosure of that pioneer patent."), aff'd, 706 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
see Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 2003-04 ("[T]he only persuasive argument courts or
commentators have offered for special treatment of pioneer inventions under the
[doctrine of equivalents] is that pioneer inventors face greater frictions than other
inventors."); Thomas, supra note 3, at 52-53 ("Compared with drafters' attempts at claims
describing more modest technological advances, courts believe that drafters of pioneer
invention claims are less able to capture the significance of the inventor's contribution
.... "); see also Azure, supra note 104, at 1181 (noting "the inherent difficulty of drafting
claims for pioneering inventions").
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1. Prosecution Frictions
One friction is the difficulty inherent in describing an invention
in words. According to this line of argument, it is simply impossible
for an inventor to draft a patent claim covering the entirety of her
invention because words do not map well to physical objects.' As
one court put it, the "conversion of machine to words allows for
unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled."" 2
According to pioneer doctrine proponents, if it is difficult for a typical
inventor to describe her creation adequately, it must be exceptionally
difficult for a pioneer inventor who, by definition, has invented
something wholly new and unique. 1 13 By virtue of the extraordinary
novelty of pioneering inventions, they argue, pioneer inventors will
frequently have to overcome an even larger gulf between language
and technology." 4
Two related frictions stem from the fact that patents are, in
addition to technical disclosures, legal documents typically prepared
by third parties. Over the decades, certain claim-drafting practices
that have little to do with facilitating the accurate description of
inventions have developed among the patent bar."' These arcane
rules, which have far more in common with standard legalese found in
commercial contracts than with technical writing techniques, may be
111. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 731 ("Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it
impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application. The inventor who
chooses to patent an invention ... bears the risk that others will devote their efforts
toward exploiting the limits of the patent's language . . ."); see also Burk & Lemley, supra
note 39, at 1745 ("[C]laim construction may be inherently indeterminate: it may simply be
impossible to cleanly map words to things."); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?
An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 223, 259 (2008) ("Claim construction may be inherently indeterminate."); Cianfrani,
supra note 109, [ 31 (arguing that claim language is "inherently incapable of perfectly
capturing the essence of an invention").
112. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
113. See Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 2004 n.267 ("[C]ourts and commentators
suggest that the limitations of language are more troubling for pioneers . . . .").
114. Moore, 211 U.S.P.Q. at 806 ("[D]rafting the disclosure and claims for a pioneer
patent is a difficult task because of the new scientific ground being broken by the unique
invention."); Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397 ("Often the invention is novel and words do not
exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot.
Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for things."); Douglas Lichtman,
Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 176 (2004) ("[IJn
complicated or rapidly evolving technologies ... it is more difficult for applicants to write
appropriate claims in the first instance . . . .").
115. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 53-56 (listing many examples of "startlingly arcane"
claim drafting conventions that "dat[e] back to the earliest days of United States patent
claiming practice," including the means-plus-function, product-by-process, Markush, and
Jepson claim formats).
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surprisingly counterintuitive and thus serve as a trap for unwary
prosecutors or inventors." 6 Also, apart from frictions associated with
the technicalities of claim drafting, a more common and subtle source
of friction is the communication gap that exists between technology-
oriented inventors and legally trained patent prosecutors."7 The
perception exists that many patents are unduly narrow because-in
addition to the effect of ordinary agency costs associated with any
principal-agent relationshipI"-patent prosecutors simply fail to
comprehend, and thus to claim, the full extent of the invention.119
116. One example is the shockingly important distinction in patent law between two
terms that are normally synonymous: "comprising" and "consisting of." U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE [hereinafter
MPEP] § 2111.03 (8th ed., rev. July 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices
/pac/mpep/index.html ("The transitional term 'comprising' ... is inclusive or open-ended
and does not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps.... The transitional
phrase 'consisting of' excludes any element, step, or ingredient not specified in the
claim.").
117. Literature reporting the low quality of attorney-client communication and
suggesting methods for improvement is legion. See, e.g., Thomas J. Watson, Improving
Lawyers' Image Starts with Client Relations, 80 Wis. LAW., July 2007, at 23, 23 (reporting
that in a Gallup poll "80 percent of respondents said lawyers should do a better job of
communicating with clients").
118. Some commentators have cautioned that agency costs may be higher than
expected in the inventor-prosecutor relationship. For example, John R. Thomas has
suggested that it is quite hard for inventors to evaluate the performance of patent
prosecutors. John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the
Post-Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 168 (2005) ("It is ... an extremely
difficult task to assess the capabilities of a particular claim drafter beyond a rudimentary
level.... [This is true] even for sophisticated enterprises."); see also 3 RONALD E.
MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 23.23, at 591 (5th ed. 2000 &
Supp. 2002) ("Because patent law practice is so technically sophisticated, even to the
ordinary attorney, few clients recognize when a patent attorney erred."). Also, because
only a tiny percentage of patents will ever be asserted, prosecutors have little incentive to
eradicate inconspicuous errors because any given oversight is unlikely to ever be
discovered by an adversary. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 79 ("Only 1.5 percent
of all patents are ever litigated, and only 0.1 percent are litigated to trial...." (citations
omitted)).
119. In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("An attorney's failure to
appreciate the full scope of the invention is one of the most common sources of defects in
patents."); see also Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents
in Patent Law: Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 673, 711
(1989) ("Most frequently, patent holders use the doctrine of equivalents to rectify what is
effectively a 'mistake' in the process of drafting and prosecuting the application in the
PTO."); Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 1994 n.219 ("[T]here is significant anecdotal
evidence suggesting that prosecutors viewed the [doctrine of equivalents] as a safety net
for prosecutorial mistakes."); Sarnoff, supra note 89, at 1208 ("The modern doctrine of
equivalents thus operates principally as an insurance policy against potential but
unrecognized mistakes in drafting... .").
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2. Timing Frictions
Two more frictions arise from patent law's preference for the
early disclosure of inventions. First, because technology will
inevitably advance between the time a patentee drafts his claims and
asserts them in litigation, patentees face the risk of inadvertently
drafting claims that fail to cover technological advances occurring
after their patents issue. 120 Again, this friction is thought to be
particularly pernicious for pioneer inventors drafting claims covering
a nascent, quickly evolving technology. 121 According to this argument,
because a pioneer invention by definition creates a wholly new
technical field, pioneer inventors are especially unlikely to foresee
precisely where further development in the area will lead and, thus,
are likely to draft claims that leave ample room for future competitors
to design around their patent.122 This outcome is thought to be
particularly unfair because it may result in a pioneer losing market
share to a rival invention his own patent enabled.123
120. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("To now say that appellants
should have disclosed in 1953 the amorphous form which on this record did not exist until
1962, would be to impose an impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent
system."); Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 1970 (noting that another "source of friction
arises from the difficulty foreseeing technical developments relevant to the patented
technology"); Note, Estopping the Madness at the PTO: Improving Patent Administration
Through Prosecution History Estoppel, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2164, 2176 (2003) ("The
doctrine of equivalents is most valuable in emerging technologies . .. [where] technology is
changing so quickly that [patentees] cannot predict how competitors might try to design
around their patents.").
121. Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 2004 n.267 ("[C]ourts and commentators suggest
... that pioneers are more troubled by later developed technology."); Thomas, supra note
3, at 52-53.
122. Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 2004 ("[W]e conjecture that many pioneer
inventors face a tougher problem visualizing and enumerating the many possible methods
of imitating a pioneer invention."); Baker, supra note 67, at 451 ("When a pioneer
invention opens up a new technical area, the possibilities for development in that area are
difficult to anticipate. The patent drafter can easily overlook all the ways in which a
seemingly essential feature of the invention can be redesigned ... ."); Fillman, supra note
106, at 529 ("Future variations are difficult to predict and claim in written form, but since
they come so rapidly, minor variations rob patents of their value."); Steinhauer, supra note
70, at 524 ("Although future technological advances may be generally foreseen by a
pioneer, the specific limitations are unknowable and thus the claim language cannot
include them.").
123. In re Goffe, 542 F.2d 564, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1976) ("For all practical purposes, the
board would limit appellant to claims involving the specific materials disclosed in the
examples, so that a competitor seeking to avoid infringing the claims would merely have to
follow the disclosure in the subsequently-issued patent to find a substitute. However, to
provide effective incentives, claims must adequately protect inventors."); Merges &
Nelson, supra note 28, at 848; Baker, supra note 67, at 452 ("Competitive products are
often made possible only by the innovation of the pioneer inventor. If such products avoid
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Second, in an effort to establish priority of invention and avoid
statutory bars, an inventor may be pressured to file a patent
application prematurely without claiming the many aspects of his
invention that remain unfinished and untested.124 Again,
commentators argue, inventors of pioneer innovations are
particularly susceptible to this friction because inventions in nascent
fields are more amorphous and require even more experimentation
and testing.125
3. Examination Frictions
Examination by the PTO offers a final opportunity for the
introduction of friction. Patent examiners must review proposed
claims subject to the same limitations of language that make claim
drafting so difficult for patentees and, even more so than patentees,
examiners find it difficult to predict how technology will develop in
the future.126 This uncertainty, commentators reason, understandably
leads to disagreement between examiners and applicants. This
disagreement in turn leads to claim rejections, and these rejections to
narrowing amendments.127 Taking the argument one step further,
infringement, ... [sluch a result is particularly unjust . ); Steinhauer, supra note 70, at
523.
124. Wegner, supra note 104, at 36 ("[Alccelerated patent prosecution ... puts
pressure on patent attorneys to draft initial claims that will cover all foreseeable
commercial embodiments of an invention that is often still in the evolutionary process.
Where only the clear vision of hindsight permits the drafting of claims of adequate scope,
some form of the doctrine of equivalents is necessary."). See generally Christopher A.
Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (2009)
(questioning whether patent law should encourage early filing of patent applications).
Wegner argues that the U.S. patent system's relative quickness "puts its patent applicants
at a competitive disadvantage compared to applicants in Europe and Japan, where the
patent systems ... allow[] a much longer time for patent prosecution." Wegner, supra note
104, at 36 & n.125 (noting that patent examination in Japan "may be deferred for up to
seven years"). The new America Invents Act changes U.S. priority rules so that patent
rights go to the first to file an application and therefore not necessarily to the first to
invent. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285-
86 (2011); see also supra note 12 (discussing how the America Invents Act changes U.S.
priority rules). In a first-to-file regime, inventors will have even greater incentives to seek
a patent quickly. See Dennis D. Crouch, Is Novelty Obsolete? Chronicling the Irrelevance
of the Invention Date in U.S. Patent Law, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 62
(2009).
125. See Baker, supra note 67, at 451 ("In contrast to a mere improvement, a pioneer
invention usually has more features that are untested.").
126. Lichtman, supra note 114, at 177-78 ("Patent prosecution takes place early in the
development of a technology, long before relevant information is available about how the
invention will mature and what its economic implications will be.").
127. Id. at 178 ("[T]he doctrine of equivalents holds out the possibility that, in rare but
appropriate circumstances, courts may in essence redraw claim boundaries using
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commentators argue that the PTO is especially ill-equipped to
properly examine pioneer claims and will frequently deny pioneer
inventors the broad claim scope they deserve. 128
4. Competition Magnifies Frictions
Finally, commentators argue, all of these frictions are particularly
detrimental to pioneers because pioneer inventions are far more
likely than average to be challenged in court.2 9 According to this
theory, rivals hoping to break into the industry created by a pioneer
invention are likely to challenge the pioneer's patent rights in court,
and the more times a patent is litigated, the more likely it is that a
competitor will eventually exploit a weakness caused by friction to
avoid infringement. 130
B. Broad Pioneering Rights Increase Overall Innovation
In addition to friction-based reasoning, commentators have
argued that granting broad patent scope to pioneer inventors
increases the overall level of innovation. These arguments generally
take one of two forms: first, that broad patent rights act as a strong ex
ante incentive for the creation of extraordinary inventions and,
second, that broad rights permit pioneer inventors to coordinate the
efficient development of improvements to their inventions ex post.
1. Ex Ante Incentive for Revolutionary Invention
To some commentators, the patent system fails to provide
sufficient incentive for the creation of revolutionary inventions. There
is, they argue, at any given time a number of potentially revolutionary
inventions lying just beyond the reach of the innovation-inducing
invisible hand of the current patent system. Though these inventions
information that was not available at the time of patent prosecution .... [L]ack of
information ... increases the likelihood that the examiner will disagree about the
appropriate literal language and therefore require the applicant to make changes during
patent prosecution."); see Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 1953 n.27 ("Arguably, courts
should be allowed to expand claim scope at trial because the passage of time and the
adversarial nature of the proceeding gives them better information than the earlier ex
parte proceeding at the PTO.").
128. See Lichtman, supra note 114, at 176 ("[I]n complicated or rapidly evolving
technologies-technologies about which it is more difficult for applicants to write
appropriate claims in the first instance ... there is more room for reasonable disagreement
between applicant and examiner. . . .").
129. See Baker, supra note 67, at 452 ("When potential profits are high, competitors
are more likely to challenge a patent's limits and validity, either through litigation or by
attempting design arounds.").
130. See id.
2012]1 411
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would be extraordinarily beneficial to society if developed, they are
not pursued with an efficient level of fervor because their
development is fraught with unpredictable costs and a high risk of
complete failure."' Without additional incentive from the patent
system, commentators fear, such inventions will be long-delayed or
never developed at all. 132
2. Ex Post Opportunity for Coordination, Especially in the
Pharmaceutical Industry
To other commentators, broad patent rights are beneficial
because they encourage patent owners to explore, improve, and
commercialize undeveloped areas of the inventive space fenced in by
their claims. This line of argument derives from Edmund Kitch's
decades-old "prospect theory" of patent protection.13 3
Kitch's theory, which he hoped would integrate the study of
intellectual property and real property rights, analogizes the tragedy
131. Oddi, supra note 104, at 1115 ("Although the potential benefits to the inventor of
revolutionary inventions are high, there are correspondingly high and unpredictable costs
associated with their development .... In this instance, the patent system should provide a
special incentive for committing significant resources to high-risk ventures whose outcome
may range from a truly revolutionary invention to a failed experiment."); Baker, supra
note 67, at 451 ("[Wlhen the organizations behind innovation structure their research and
development programs, they must consider the marginal benefits of their investments.
With greater value afforded to pioneer inventions, these organizations will be more likely
to direct research and development toward the most challenging technical problems,
where the risk of failure is great.").
132. See Baker, supra note 67, at 450-53. To other commentators, the pioneer doctrine
primarily operates as a rough form of societal restitution to inventors, in which the public
returns to the inventor ex post some portion of the inventive (or public) domain as a
reward for bestowing an extraordinary benefit upon society. See Thomas, supra note 3, at
58 ("[A] liberal interpretation [of pioneer claims] flows from the belief that in the
exchange of technological disclosure for exclusive rights, the public received an
extraordinary bargain, for which the pioneer inventor should receive additional
compensation." (footnote omitted)). Consider, for example, the court's generous
description of Whitney's cotton gin in Whitney v. Carter:
Is there a man who hears us who has not experienced its utility? The whole
interior of the Southern states was languishing . . . when the invention of this
machine at once opened views to them which set the whole country in active
motion. From childhood to age, it has presented us a lucrative employment.
Individuals who were depressed with poverty, and sunk in idleness, have suddenly
risen to wealth and respectability. Our debts have been paid off, our capitals
increased, and our lands have trebled in value. We cannot express the weight of
obligation which the country owes to this invention; the extent of it cannot now be
seen.
29 F. Cas. 1070, 1072 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810) (No. 17,583).
133. See Kitch, supra note 105, at 266.
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of the commons to patent law to argue that broad patent rights
encourage patentees to improve and commercialize their inventions
much in the same way that exclusive property ownership encourages
landowners to put their land to the most efficient use.13 The "tragedy
of the commons" is traditional economic shorthand for the fact that
those using a common piece of property will tend to overuse and
exhaust the property's resources because each individual user enjoys
the benefits of her personal use, but shares the costs with all other
users.3 5 Thus, common pastures will be overgrazed, common waters
overfished, common woodlands deforested, and the like." 6
Destruction of the commons is solved by assigning property rights to
individual users, who as property owners bear the full cost of their
actions and, thus, have appropriate incentives to use their land
responsibly.137 Combined with Coasean notions of cost-free
bargaining, property rights further permit the newly minted property
owners to enter into transactions with one another that will
eventually put their land to the best use possible.' Landowners will
gladly sell neighboring ranchers grazing rights to their unused
grasslands, will efficiently harvest their own fisheries and forests or
sell rights to others who can, and so on until the most efficient
allocation is achieved.
To Kitch, inventive space is just as susceptible to waste as a real
property commons. Like ranchers sharing a common field, inventors
racing to secure patent rights related to a particular technological
area will tend to "overgraze." That is, as inventors race to patent
various aspects of a new innovation, they will engage in wasteful and
duplicative inventive activity in hopes of securing as much of the
available inventive space as possible before it is completely
patented.'
Prospect theory posits that the solution to inefficient inventive
rivalry is the same as the solution to overuse of common resources:
134. Id. at 276.
135. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,1244 (1968).
136. See id. at 1244-45.
137. Id. at 1245.
138. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1095 (1972) ("In such a
frictionless society, transactions would occur until no one could be made better off as a
result of further transactions without making someone else worse off.").
139. See, e.g., Pankaj Tandon, Rivalry and the Excessive Allocation of Resources to
Research, 14 BELL J. ECON. 152, 152 (1983) (developing an economic model that suggests
"there may be a tendency for firms to perform excessive R&D, or ... [to] 'rush to invent'
which dissipates much of the social benefit from research").
2012] 413
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exclusive rights. Kitch observed that, much in the same fashion that
the mineral claim system allows a prospector to secure the exclusive
right to develop a newly discovered mineral deposit before engaging
in full-scale excavation, the patent system allows an inventor to
secure broad patent rights covering a technological discovery well
before that discovery has been fully explored, advanced, and
commercialized.14 According to Kitch, this is advantageous because it
consolidates in the hands of one inventor control of a broad swath of
inventive space and thereby eliminates competitors' incentives to race
to claim a portion of that space.14 ' Just as importantly, Kitch argues, it
permits the patent holder to coordinate exploration and
commercialization of the entire technological area by licensing the
right to commercialize portions of the prospect to the firms best
positioned to do so.142
Prospect theory thus suggests that innovation is optimally
incentivized when a single entity is vested early on with broad patent
rights that allow it to control an entire technological field. If broad
rights do indeed encourage the development and commercialization
of improved embodiments and related inventions, one might expect
broad rights to be particularly beneficial for a pioneer inventor whose
invention by definition created an entirely new field of technological
endeavor.
Commentators point to the pharmaceutical industry as the
modern industry most suited to Kitch's vision of the patent system. 143
R&D costs in the pharmaceutical industry are exceptionally high and,
even after a new drug is developed, it must be approved by the FDA
before it can be sold to the public.'" Further, absent strong patent
140. Kitch, supra note 105, at 267-75.
141. Id. at 276.
142. Id. at 279.
143. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 9, at 1616 ("The prospect
vision of patents maps most closely onto invention in the pharmaceutical industry.").
144. Industry estimates of the cost of new drug creation range as high as $1 billion. See
Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is
Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 470 (2007); see also
BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 11, at 215 ("[R]ecent estimates ... place the total cost of
bringing a new drug to market at around $800 million, in year 2000 dollars. Even if a
number of researchers have questioned [the] methodology [behind these estimates], this
figure suggests a spectacular increase in the cost of innovating. This increase is due,
mostly, to the capitalization of the longer and more expensive clinical trials the ... [FDA]
requires." (footnote omitted)). See generally MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION
PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS (2004) (examining the factors that
drive the cost of new drugs and concluding that a significant amount of innovation is
funded by the public, as opposed to the private sector).
414 [Vol. 90
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protection, imitation in the pharmaceutical industry is relatively easy.
If an inventor's rights are limited to the precise composition he
intends to sell, competitors can readily develop a generic alternative
using a close chemical analog and, in some circumstances, can avoid
the FDA approval process altogether.'4 5 Thus, in the face of fierce
inventive rivalry, pharmaceutical firms may choose not to make the
large investments necessary to develop a new drug.14s
3. Clearing Patent Thickets, Especially in the Biotechnology Industry
Finally, in a more modern corollary to Kitch's prospect theory,
several scholars have argued that extending broad patent rights to
pioneers may increase overall innovation in industries where "patent
thickets" or "anticommons" make the development of new
technologies more costly.147 A patent thicket arises when multiple
patents with overlapping scope cover the same product.'48 Similarly,
an anticommons exists where inputs to, or steps in the manufacture
of, a final product were individually patented by multiple inventors.149
In both situations, the fragmented nature of patent rights impedes
innovation because a company hoping to sell a product must
145. By filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application, a generic drug manufacturer can
seek FDA approval before name-brand manufacturers' patents expire. See Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 5050), 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2006); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676-77 (1990) (describing the generic drug review process).
146. Brief of Amici Curiae the Regents of the University of California et al. on En
Banc Rehearing in Support of Affirmance of Judgment at 9, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1248), 2009 WL 3657817 ("Patent
exclusivity granted for pioneering biological inventions fuels the creation and recruitment
of commercial entities willing to undertake the huge investments necessary to refine and
develop foundational university research into medical and biopharmaceutical products
widely accessible to the general public. Denial of patent protection for university
inventions removes the incentive for private investment in the commercialization of
biotechnological inventions, keeping important and possibly life-saving advancements out
of the public's reach . . . ").
147. Kitch's work, in fact, suggests the existence of these problems. See Kitch, supra
note 105, at 285 ("[A] claim system may generate separate ownership rights in areas that
upon further development turn out to be subject to the most efficient exploitation under
unified control.").
148. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119-20 (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2000).
149. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622 (1998) ("In an
anticommons ... multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from
a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When too many owners
hold such rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse-a tragedy of the
anticommons."); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699-700 (1998).
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negotiate licenses with multiple patent owners or risk suit for patent
infringement.
Commentators point to the biotechnology industry as the
modern industry most hampered by splintered ownership of patent
rights. In many areas of biotechnology, patent rights hinder
innovators' access to both vertical and horizontal complements.
Among many others, inventors have patented laboratory animals,
reagents, stem cell lines, DNA sequencing algorithms, and tens of
thousands of DNA sequences covering genes and gene fragments.5 0
As a result, any current innovator hoping to develop a new
biomedical treatment or diagnostic test must first obtain multiple
licenses from multiple patent owners or risk suit for infringement. To
the extent that it is even possible (as a practical matter) to license all
relevant patent rights from their various owners, paying numerous
royalties to enter the market significantly reduces incentives to invest
in the development of new technology.'
III. AGAINST THE PIONEER DOCTRINE
Though plausible on their face, below the surface these oft-
repeated justifications for the pioneer doctrine contradict empirical
evidence, historical experience, and economic theory. This part
counters each argument presented above. Indeed, these arguments
fare no better than scholarly consensus on the doctrine's irrelevance.
As noted below, pioneers receive extraordinarily broad claim scope
without help from the pioneer doctrine, and historical evidence
strongly suggests that innovation suffers in markets dominated by
patentees with near monopoly power.
A. Patent-Drafting Frictions Are Illusory
Contrary to the assertions of pioneer doctrine advocates,
concerns about claim scope frictions are greatly overstated. Indeed, it
is almost certainly true that these frictions affect pioneers even less
than they affect ordinary applicants.
150. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 297 (2003). The patentability of DNA
sequences was recently affirmed by the Federal Circuit. See infra note 352.
151. See Shapiro, supra note 148, at 124 ("[T]he prospect of paying [multiple] royalties
necessarily reduces the return to new product design and development, and thus can easily
be a drag on innovation and commercialization of new technologies.").
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1. Pioneer Claims Are Simple to Draft
First, pioneer inventors should have the easiest time of all
drafting broad patent claims. The reason is simple: by definition,
pioneer inventions open up new fields in which little or no prior art
exists. 5 2 Much of the difficulty associated with claim drafting stems
from the need to draft long, complex claims to distinguish the
proposed invention from the prior art.153 Free from the constraints of
closely related prior art, pioneer inventors can draft claims using
broad language. 154
There is simply no evidence that pioneer inventors draft unduly
narrow claims.s15  To the contrary, many pioneers have drafted
famously broad claims. Morse, for example, claimed "electro-
magnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible
characters, letters, or signs, at any distances"-a claim so broad it
covers every communication device on the market 170 years after it
was issued.'16 Bell likewise claimed all of telephony-all devices "for
transmitting vocal or other sounds ... by causing electrical
undulations, similar in form to the vibrations of the air accompanying
the said vocal or other sounds."15 7
152. Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 287 F.3d 1097, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("A pioneer patent
by definition will have little applicable prior art to limit it, whereas an improvement
patent's scope is confined by the existing knowledge on which the improvement is
based."); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 9, at 1656 ("There is little prior art in
a newly opened field that would prevent the inventor from claiming broadly.").
153. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 56 ("[Claim drafting] may be at its most difficult
when an invention presents only a narrow advance in a crowded technological art, rather
than a revolutionary advance.").
154. Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir.
1999) ("Without extensive prior art to confine and cabin their claims, pioneers acquire
broader claims than non-pioneers who must craft narrow claims to evade the strictures of
a crowded art field"); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 150, at 296 ("Unconstrained by prior
art, [patents on early stage discoveries] may be quite broad, permitting their owners to
control subsequent research across a significant range of problems."); Thomas, supra note
3, at 56 ("Because the field of endeavor in which the pioneer invention sits is sparse,
inventors can draft short claims using sweeping language with ample technological
scope.").
155. What little empirical evidence there is suggests that pioneers do receive broad
claims. John R. Thomas reviewed the prosecution history of pioneer patents and found
that "the paucity of prior art was, if anything, the forerunner of a smooth prosecution
despite the sweeping claims generally found in these patents." Thomas, supra note 3, at 57.
Thomas also surveyed a small number of patent prosecutors who reported that it is
difficult to draft claims covering even simple devices in crowded arts. Id.
156. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 86 (1853). The Supreme Court
invalidated Morse's claim for lack of enablement. Id. at 119-20.
157. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 531 (1888). The Supreme Court upheld Bell's
claim, despite recognizing that "electricity cannot be used at all for the transmission of
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In addition, rather than acting to constrain claim scope, many
technical claim-drafting rules actually facilitate the transformation of
an invention into a broad claim. With means-plus-function claim
language, an inventor can draft a claim covering all known "means
for" performing some function, without limiting herself to a finite list
of specific examples."' For example, an inventor can claim a "means
for fastening" rather than reciting "nails, screws, rivets, tape, glue,"
and a laundry list of every other possible means for attaching one
thing to another.'59 The Markush claiming format similarly allows an
inventor to claim an invention with an element selected from a known
class of substitutes.160
Other, far simpler conventions also help mitigate language-
related frictions. Notably, U.S. patent law permits applicants to file
multiple independent and dependent claims. Thus inventors never
have to choose between two roughly equal descriptive words or
decide whether to tempt fate with a riskier claim formulation rather
than settle for a safer alternative. Subject to the cost of PTO and
attorneys' fees, inventors can always avoid these risks by filing
multiple claims.' 6' Courts also routinely uphold patent claims that
contain terms of degree like "approximate," "substantially," and
"readily."' 6 2 Finally, if all else fails, patentees are free to simply
speech except in the way Bell has discovered, and that, therefore, practically, his patent
gives him its exclusive use for that purpose . . . ." Id. at 535.
158. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("An element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof."); see also supra note 15 (providing a brief overview of changes made
to § 112 by the America Invents Act). Means-plus-function claiming does, however, limit
the inventor to contemporary technology. See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174
F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that means-plus-function claims are strictly
limited to structural equivalents "available at the time of the issuance of the claim").
159. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 31-32 (3d ed. 2002); see also Al-Site Corp., 174 F.3d at
1316-17 (interpreting the phrase "fastening means").
160. See MPEP, supra note 116, § 803.02 (citing Ex parte Markush, 1925 C.D. 126
(Comm'r Pat. 1925)). Markush claims are most often used to claim all functionally-
equivalent members of a recognized chemical class. Id.
161. PTO fees increase with the number of claims submitted for examination. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.16(h)-(j) (2010).
162. See Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(holding that "the claim limitation 'readily installed and replaced by a user' is not
indefinite"); Verve, L.L.C. v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("It is
well established that when the term 'substantially' serves reasonably to describe the
subject matter ... it is not indefinite."); Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elecs., Inc., 847 F.2d 819,
821-22 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that the claim terms "closely approximate" and
"substantially equal" are "ubiquitous in patent claims" and "have been accepted in patent
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construct their own terminology: it is a venerable canon of claim
construction that a patentee may -"act[] as his or her own
lexicographer."163
Concerns about mistakes during prosecution are also likely
overblown. Several scholars, for example, observe that most alleged
prosecution "errors" were, in reality, calculated claim-drafting
decisions that only look foolish in hindsight." In any event, when
patent claims are inadvertently issued in a narrowed format, the
Patent Act itself provides a corrective mechanism. Section 251 of the
Act permits the PTO to "reissue" patents that were "defective" when
originally issued." Under this provision, a patentee can request,
within two years of her patent's issuance, that the PTO reissue the
patent "in accordance with a new and amended application" if the
patent was defective "by reason of the patentee claiming ... less than
he had a right to claim in the patent."1" The reissue mechanism,
which has been available to patentees since at least the early 1830s,117
was actually designed to facilitate the correction of claim-drafting
mistakes. 168
examination and upheld by the courts"); see also Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66
F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("about"); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments,
Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("close proximity").
163. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also id. at
1316 ("Consistent with that general principle, our cases recognize that the specification
may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the
meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor's lexicography governs.").
164. Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 1974 (noting that narrow claim language in many
cases is the result of the fact that "prosecutors and inventors strategically choose narrow
claims to limit disclosure to the examiner and avoid patentability problems, or because the
inventor decides to seek a mix of patent and trade secret protection"); Sarnoff, supra note
89, at 1207 ("[I]n most (if not all) cases, errors in failing to claim equivalents actually
reflect strategic decisions in prosecuting patents rather than failures of judgment."). At the
very least, poorly drafted patent claims reflect an inventors' failure to devote additional
time and resources to prosecution. See F. Scott Kief, The Case for Registering Patents and
the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 110 (2003);
Meurer & Nard, supra note 3, at 1971 ("Inventors can reduce the likelihood of mistakes by
spending more time and money on prosecution, choosing a prosecutor with a good
reputation, and effectively monitoring the prosecution.").
165. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
166. Id.; see also Johnson & Johnston Assoc., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046,1055
(Fed. Cir. 2002) ("A patentee who inadvertently fails to claim disclosed subject matter,
however, is not left without remedy. Within two years from the grant of the original
patent, a patentee may file a reissue application and attempt to enlarge the scope of the
original claims to include the disclosed but previously unclaimed subject matter.").
167. See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 240-43 (1832). Reissue was first
codified in 1836. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 13, 5 Stat. 117, 122 (repealed 1952).
168. See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892) (arguing that "the obvious intent"
behind the reissue mechanism is to compensate for the fact "that valuable inventions are
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Further, courts occasionally apply the doctrine of equivalents to
stretch even the most precise claim language. In Winans v.
Denmead,6 9 for example, the Supreme Court held that a claim
covering a conical or cylindrical coal-carrying railroad car-a car
shaped "in the form of a frustum of a cone"-could, under the
doctrine of equivalents, cover an accused car that was octagonal in
shape."o Similarly, in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
Co.,"' the Court held that a rather exacting claim for a dye
purification process requiring a pH level in the range "approximately
6.0 to 9.0" could, under the doctrine of equivalents, be stretched to
cover an accused process using a pH of,5.0.17 2
Finally, when faced with a clear mistake that is not otherwise
remediable, patentees may seek recourse through the tort system.
Malpractice lawsuits against patent agents and attorneys are common
and act as a significant deterrent to prosecution errors."
2. Pioneer Claims Expand to Capture Later-Arising Technology
It is also untrue that technology arising after a patent is issued
places the inventor's patent rights in jeopardy. Patentees may assert
their claims against these technologies literally or through the
doctrine of equivalents.
a. Literally
First, a patent's literal claim scope will frequently cover later-
arising technology. One reason for the surprising elasticity of literal
claim scope is the fact that word meanings tend to change over time
to accommodate current needs. In particular, as a technical field
matures, the scope of terminology in that field tends to expand with
often placed in the hands of inexperienced persons ... [who] frequently fail to describe
with requisite certainty the exact invention of the patentee"); see also Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 614-17 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing
that broad application of the doctrine of equivalents improperly supersedes the reissue
process). Patentees very rarely take advantage of the opportunity to reissue patents. In
2010, the PTO issued more than 244,000 patents, but reissued only 947. U.S. Patent
Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2010, supra note 90.
169. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
170. Id. at 339-40.
171. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
172. See id. at 23, 32-33, 40-41.
173. See A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice: An Oxymoron No More, 2004
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2004) (finding that "courts have decided at least three
times the number of malpractice cases against patent attorneys in the past fourteen years
as in the first two hundred years of our federal patent system").
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time to encompass successive technological advances. 174 Because the
meaning of claim terms will inevitably be determined by a judge
many years after the patent issued,"' patentees benefit from this
subtle evolution."' In SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises,"' for
example, the Federal Circuit held that the claim term "regularly
received television signals" covered modern digital television even
though the claim language was drafted in 1985.178 Likewise, in Laser
Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons,"' the Seventh Circuit held that
the 1957 claim term "collimated beam of light" literally covered laser
technology.18 Patentees' rights also continue in full force even if
unanticipated advances in technology make it possible to use the
patented invention in a new, unforeseeable way. For example, in B.G.
Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co.,"' the Second Circuit held that a spark
plug patent, issued from an application filed in 1927, covered use of
patented design in an airplane even though the inventor "did not
foresee the particular adaptability of his plug to the airplane." 18 2
174. Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1757 ("Words change in meaning, sometimes
slowly as language evolves, but sometimes with surprising rapidity. ... Change in the
meaning of language is particularly likely in the case of innovation, since the terms in
question are often new and the concepts they represent are not yet fully understood."
(footnote omitted)); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104
MICH. L. REV. 101, 102 (2005).
175. Generally, a year or two may pass between invention and the time a patent
application is filed, see 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (requiring that an application be filed
within one year of a public use or sale of the invention); see also supra note 12 (describing
the changes made to § 102 by the America Invents Act), 2.77 years on average will pass
between filing and the patent's issuance, Allison & Lemley, supra note 22, at 98, and many
more years will pass between issue and claim construction, see John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 237
(1998) (finding that on average 12.3 years pass between the time a patent application is
filed and the resolution of a suit asserting the resulting patent).
176. Though the Federal Circuit has stated that claim terms are to be construed "at the
time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application," see
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), claim construction
is more nuanced in practice and courts have often interpreted claims to cover accused
devices developed after those claims were filed, see Lemley, supra note 174, at 108-10.
One notable exception is means-plus-function claims, which are strictly limited to
structural equivalents "available at the time of the issuance of the claim." Al-Site Corp. v.
VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308,1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
177. 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
178. Id. at 876-81; see also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1257-58
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that the meaning of the claim term "monoclonal antibody"
changed greatly between 1984 and 1995, but declining to consider the term's construction
because the patent at issue was invalid).
179. 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974).
180. Id. at 872.
181. 79 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1935).
182. Id. at 22.
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Finally, the PTO has awarded broad claim scope to the initial
inventors of synthetic versions of naturally occurring chemical and
biological substances. In several cases, these inventors have been
awarded claims covering not just the process for manufacturing the
synthetic chemical, but also claims covering the substance itself. In
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co.,'83 for example, Judge
Learned Hand upheld a patent covering purified human adrenaline,
not just the process for purifying the natural substance." With claims
covering the substance, these patentees can exclude all later-arising
methods for making that substance, even ones that are fundamentally
different and superior. In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v.
Genentech, Inc.,8 for example, the human blood clotting protein
Factor VIII:C that Genentech produced using recombinant DNA
technology was held to infringe Scripps's patent covering purified
Factor VIII:C created using Scripps' older, less sophisticated process
of deriving the protein from human blood plasma.'86
b. Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
Even if later-arising technology escapes claim construction it may
still be covered by the doctrine of equivalents. Indeed, this is one of
the principal reasons for the doctrine's existence." The Supreme
Court has expressly held that "the question under the doctrine of
equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed
183. 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
184. Id. at 102-03; see also Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156,
161-64 (4th Cir. 1958) (upholding patent covering purified vitamin B 12 ); in re Bergstrom,
427 F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (reversing examiner's rejection of patent covering
purified prostaglandin compounds). This line of precedent laid the foundation for later
patents covering isolated DNA sequences. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the
Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721, 727-29 (1990).
185. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
186. Id. at 1390 ("Scripps is entitled to claim [in a product claim] purified Factor VIII:C
having the characteristics of human Factor VIII:C, whether derived through its disclosed
process or any other process achieving the same result."); see also Hormone Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562-64 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (determining that
Genentech's recombinant DNA-produced synthetic HGH did not literally infringe
Hormone Research Foundation's ("HRF") patent covering a synthetic HGH that HRF
produced via an older "solid phase peptide synthesis process," but only because
Genentech's synthetic hormone was chemically distinct from HRF's); Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., 706 F. Supp. 94, 101 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding that recombinant DNA-
produced EPO infringed a patent claiming purified EPO originally derived from urine).
Both Amgen's and Scripps' claims were later invalidated on unrelated grounds. See
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1215-18 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Scripps Clinic
& Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1547, 1561 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
187. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595,606 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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element, the proper time for evaluating equivalency-and thus
knowledge of interchangeability between elements-is at the time of
infringement, not at the time the patent was issued."'"
There is simply no evidence that pioneer inventors have been
unfairly preempted by the arrival of new technology allowing
competitors to easily design around their patent rights. To the
contrary, in a number of cases even ordinary inventors have been
generously rewarded under the doctrine of equivalents with broad
claim scope covering later-developed technology. For example, the
doctrine of equivalents has been used to protect patentees from
unforeseen advancements in computer technology. In Hughes
Aircraft v. United States,'" the Federal Circuit held that a patent
covering a means for controlling the attitude of a satellite by sending
control signals from an earthbound station was infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents by a later-developed system that controlled
satellite attitude via a microprocessor located onboard the satellite.'90
Despite the clear distinction between the two systems, the Federal
Circuit found them to be "identical ... except for the employment of
sophisticated, post-[invention] equipment (computers)" and held that
such "an embellishment made possible by post-[invention]
technology, does not allow the accused spacecraft to escape the 'web
of infringement.' "191
Finally, because equivalency is determined as a legal matter "at
the time of infringement,"" and as a practical matter during the
course of litigation occurring well after infringement began, patentees
benefit greatly from hindsight bias.'9 3 A judge, juror, or expert witness
considering whether an improvement falls within or outside of the
scope of a patent claim will necessarily rely on his opinion of the
improvement today. Even if asked to do so, he will find it difficult or
impossible to conceptualize what he would have thought of the
improvement when it was discovered years ago. As a result, patentees
benefit from the well-documented fact "that hindsight often leads
observers to label obvious in retrospect an invention that was
188. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997).
189. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
190. Id. at 1364-65; see also Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d
866, 872-73 (finding the patent at issue infringed under the doctrine of equivalents).
191. Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1365.
192. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37.
193. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (2001).
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significant at the time it was made." 94 Thus, the backward-looking
nature of the equivalency inquiry ensures that patentees' claim scope
will frequently expand to cover later-arising improvements.
3. Pioneers Can Freely Overclaim
It is also untrue that patentees must surrender claim scope in
order to satisfy the patent system's preference for early disclosure.
a. Enablement, Reduction to Practice, and Utility
Patentees benefit from a number of patent rules that permit
them to claim more inventive ground than they explored and
disclosed. For one, the PTO will only reject a proposed claim for lack
of enablement if the patent examiner can point to specific
documentary evidence suggesting that it is impossible to make a
claimed embodiment without additional information. 195 As a result,
the PTO frequently issues claims that "cover ground that examiners
believe, but cannot prove, is well beyond the area actually explored
and disclosed by the inventor." 196 Enablement doctrine also permits a
patentee to claim a generic class of materials thought to be
substitutable at the time the patent was filed, even if a large portion
of the class is later discovered to be inoperable." Similarly, an
inventor can quickly claim a compound made from a particular
process before the inventor is capable of identifying the compound.198
In fact, patent law permits an inventor to obtain a patent before
building a prototype or even knowing for sure why-or even
whether-the invention works as disclosed. Though an invention must
be reduced to practice prior to patenting, the doctrine of constructive
reduction to practice permits a purported inventor to file a patent
194. Id. Hindsight bias has been studied extensively in the literature of other
disciplines. See, e.g., Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 147 passim (1991).
195. Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 848-49 (citing In re Armbruster, 512 F.2d 676,
680 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Geerdes, 491 F.2d 1260, 1265 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).
196. Id.
197. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (upholding as enabled a patent claim covering a class of explosive
emulsions, forty percent of which were later found to be inoperable). On the other hand,
because the enablement requirement depends in part on "the predictability or
unpredictability of the art," In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (listing
predictability as one of eight factors), the enablement bar may be raised slightly when
applied to inventions in new, unexplored fields.
198. MPEP, supra note 116, § 2113 (describing the "product-by-process" claim format).
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application without building a working model.199 Courts have also
held that a patentee need not know or understand why his invention
works.200 Indeed, a patentee need not even know for sure whether his
invention is useful for the purpose disclosed in the specification.2 0'
b. Continuation Applications
In any event, patentees who need additional time to draft claims
are protected by the availability of continuation applications.202 At
any time during the life of her patent, a patentee can file a
continuation application in hopes of winning broader claims.203
Unlike the rarely used reissue proceeding, patentees frequently take
advantage of continuations: Lemley and Moore found that
twenty-three percent of all patents granted between 1976 and 2000,
and fifty-two percent of all patents litigated during the same time
period, issued from continuation applications. 21 There is no limit on
the number of continuations a patentee can file, and it is not rare for
a sophisticated patent owner to keep a continuation application open
during the entire life of her patent.205
Using (or perhaps abusing) the continuation process, it is
surprisingly simple for a patentee to win claims covering products and
technology introduced into the market well after her original
199. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
200. See, e.g., Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435-36
(1911) ("A patentee may be baldly empirical, seeing nothing beyond his experiments and
the result; yet if he has added a new and valuable article to the world's utilities, he is
entitled to the rank and protection of an inventor. And how can it take from his merit that
he may not know all of the forces which he has brought into operation? It is certainly not
necessary that he understand or be able to state the scientific principles underlying his
invention...."); Eames v. Andrews, 122 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1887).
201. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a patent
covering a compound structurally similar to effective chemotherapeutic agents satisfied
the utility requirement even though the patented compound itself had not yet been proven
effective in humans).
202. The availability of continuation applications has long been codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 120 (2006). As a result of legislation passed in 2000, applicants can now prosecute a
continuation without filing a new application. See Request for Continued Examination
Practice and Changes to Provisional Application Practice, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,092, 50,093
(Aug. 16, 2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. H§ 1.53(b), (d) (2010)). An inventor can also file a
"continuation-in-part" application if she wishes to add new subject matter to her original
application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b). However, continuation-in-part applications may only
claim priority back to the date of the original application for claims not arising from the
added subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) ("No amendment shall introduce new matter
into the disclosure of the invention.").
203. Lemley & Moore, supra note 22, at 68.
204. Id. at 69.
205. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 78, 81.
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application was filed. This practice, sometimes called "submarine
patenting,'206 is possible because the continuation process ensures
that a patentee can attempt to prosecute additional claims anytime
before the original application expires. A savvy patentee can file an
original application with a broad disclosure and patiently lie in wait
for a competitor to introduce a successful product falling within the
scope of the patent's specification. The patentee can then file a
continuation application and prosecute new claims targeting that
later-developed product. 207 The Federal Circuit has even embraced
this practice, stating
there is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a
patent application for the purpose of obtaining a right to
exclude a known competitor's product from the market; nor is
it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended
to cover a competitor's product the applicant's attorney has
learned about during the prosecution of a patent application.208
4. Leniency for New Technology at the PTO
Further, there is good reason to believe that pioneers receive
especially lenient treatment at the PTO. This leniency stems from the
fact that the PTO is ill equipped to locate prior art in nascent fields. 2 09
PTO examiners most often locate prior art in databases of issued
patents. But, there will be few if any patents issued in a new, evolving
field. 210 At best, when a potentially pioneering invention is made in an
established scientific and technical area, prior art may exist in issues
of academic and professional journals or in conference proceedings.211
206. Lemley & Moore, supra note 22, at 65.
207. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 78 ("If the applicant is dissatisfied with the
claims allowed by the patent examiner, the applicant can file a continuation application
even after receiving a patent and thus continue to seek a patent with broader claims....
Applicants are even allowed to amend their applications to capture products that are
appearing in the market, so long as they (arguably) stay within the bounds of the invention
described in the initial application, which can be broad and rather vague.").
208. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (en banc).
209. Note, supra note 120, at 2171 ("Although emerging technologies, by definition,
contain less prior art, the PTO often misses entirely the prior art that does exist. In some
cases, the PTO fails to discover prior art because it lacks the resources or the expertise to
keep up in a rapidly changing field."); see also Cohen & Lemley, supra note 193, at 43
("The patent system presumes a finite, comprehensively indexed technical literature and
relies on individual examiners to define, access, and search the relevant subliteratures.").
210. See Note, supra note 120, at 2171 ("For emerging technologies, a search through a
database of existing patents will yield very little prior art.").
211. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 193, at 42 (explaining that "innovation tak[ing] place
outside traditional research institutions" will often be "recorded in ways that tend to elude
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At worst, when the invention relates to an area like software, finance,
or e-commerce that falls outside the interests of the established
research community, what little prior art exists is unlikely to have
been published in printed form at all.212 Given the diffuse nature of
prior art in new fields and the time pressure examiners feel to slog
through an increasing backlog of applications,2 13 it may simply be
impossible for the PTO to accurately assess the novelty of particularly
cutting-edge inventions. As a result, pioneers' broad claims are
unlikely to be rejected by the PTO in light of prior art. Consequently,
pioneers are far less likely than ordinary applicants to amend their
claims during prosecution and, therefore, less likely to suffer from the
effect of prosecution history estoppel later in litigation.214
5. Positive Externalities Discourage Litigation Against Pioneers
It is also unlikely that pioneer patents will face multiple
challenges from competitors because patent challenges generate
positive externalities. When an accused infringer successfully limits,
invalidates, or renders a patent unenforceable in litigation, all market
participants benefit because they are free to use the invention without
restriction. 215 Because a firm challenging a patent bears the full cost of
the formal system of technical documentation" whereas "in fields more closely linked to
the scientific and technical establishment" innovation is "typically ... documented in peer-
reviewed professional journals, conference abstracts, and the like").
212. Id. ("[SJoftware innovations ... may be documented only via developer
specifications or online FAQs. Frequently, the source code itself is never released at all.");
see also Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 279-80 (2000) ("Commercial business models of the
type that are being applied to the Internet, are likely, if anything, to be less well
documented than financial methods. There simply is no real scientific literature on
business models."); Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance
Patents, 1971-2000, 57 J. FIN. 901, 905 n.5, 926 (2002) (finding that finance patents have on
average eight times more citations to academic papers than patents covering inventions
related to chemistry, energy, instrumentation, microbiology, and surgery).
213. On average, a patent examiner will spend just eighteen hours total on each
application he reviews. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95
Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001). At the close of 2009, the PTO employed just over 6,000
examiners and faced a backlog of more than 700,000 applications awaiting their first office
action. Patent Inventory Statistics-FYO9, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://
www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/appbacklog.jsp (last modified Oct. 7, 2009).
214. See Bagley, supra note 212, at 282; Cohen & Lemley, supra note 193, at 43-44.
Under the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, patentees are precluded from
asserting later in litigation that their claims cover subject matter they disclaimed during
prosecution to avoid prior art or overcome some concern affecting patentability. See
Lichtman, supra note 114, at 153.
215. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative
Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) ("[A] challenger
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litigation but shares the benefit of invalidating or limiting the patent
with its competitors, a company hoping to enter a pioneer-dominated
market actually has little incentive to take on the pioneer.2 16 Further,
empirical evidence reveals that the most litigated patents of all are
not broad patents guarding a technological field; instead they are
predominantly weak, software patents held by non-practicing
entities.217
6. First Mover Advantages
Finally, initial patent rights aside, pioneer inventions have a
natural advantage in the race to design and claim next-generation
technology. Because pioneers by definition open up a new market,
they are well positioned to exploit their position as the first player in
the market they created. Empirical studies have shown that, like
patent rights, first mover advantages encourage innovation. Some
studies have even found that in certain industries first mover
advantages are more effective than patent rights.218 Pioneers will
likely be the first to offer a product in their market and, accordingly,
have a head start constructing production and distribution
infrastructure and establishing brand loyalty.219 In some industries,
pioneers may be able to establish industry standards that further
bears the cost of litigation but its rivals and downstream buyers will capture almost all the
benefits of successful challenge .. ); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 88; Shapiro,
supra note 3, at 119.
216. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 215, at 958.
217. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 680, 692, 695-96 (2011) (studying
patents litigated eight or more times and finding that (1) suits enforcing such patents are
successful only 10.7% of the time when litigated to a final resolution, (2) 63.5% of such
patents are owned by non-practicing entities, and (3) 74.1% of such patents are software-
related).
218. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1290 (2010)
(finding in a survey of start-up companies that first mover advantage was the most
"important" means to "capture competitive advantage" in the medical device and
software industries); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 816 (1987)
(finding that "[1]ead time .. . [s]ecrecy, learning advantages, and sales and service efforts
... are typically more important than the patent system"); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R.
Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (finding in a 1994 survey of 1,478 R&D labs that "patents
tend to be the least emphasized .. . and secrecy and lead time tend to be emphasized most
heavily").
219. See sources cited supra note 218.
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cement their dominant market position.22 0 As first movers, pioneers
will have ample lead time in developing and patenting improvements
and related products or services, which in many cases may become
more profitable than the original invention.221
B. Broad Pioneering Rights Reduce Overall Innovation
Next, contrary to assertions of pioneer doctrine advocates,
extending broad patent rights to inventors in a nascent market will
not increase overall innovation. In fact, the history of innovation is
filled with counterexamples where broad patents quite clearly stifled
innovation for years.
1. Broad Pioneer Scope Has Little Impact Ex Ante
Supporters of the pioneer doctrine can point to very little
evidence that innovators have failed to pursue potentially pioneering
inventions with less than optimal zeal. Virtually every innovation
commonly recognized as a pioneer was independently invented by
two or more inventors working at roughly the same time to solve the
same known problem. Rather than expanded patent scope, by some
metrics these pioneers should have received no patent rights at all. In
any event, the pioneer doctrine can have at most a miniscule effect on
inventors' ex ante decision making.
a. History Shows Intense Rivalry to Patent Supposed
"Pioneers"
For almost a century when setting out the pioneer invention
doctrine, courts stated that "[c]onspicuous examples of pioneer
patents are those to Howe of the sewing machine, to Morse of the
electrical telegraph and to Bell of the telephone." 2 22 Each of these
three inventions was the subject of a highly publicized and
contentious battle for patent rights.
Elias Howe fired the first shot in what became known as the
"Sewing Machine War" by filing suit in 1852 against I.M. Singer &
220. See Lemley, supra note 73, at 1066-67.
221. For example, Jack Kilby of Texas Instruments, inventor of the first integrated
circuit, also invented the first handheld calculator using integrated circuit technology. T.R.
REID, THE CHIP: How TWO AMERICANS INVENTED THE MICROCHIP AND LAUNCHED A
REVOLUTION 166-71 (2001).
222. S. Saw Serv., Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Erie Saw Corp., 239 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1956)
(citing Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 562 (1898)); see also
Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 95-218-SLR, 1998 WL 151411, at *44
(D. Del. 1998) (citing Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 562
(1898)).
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Co., which in 1850 sold the first practical sewing machine
incorporating the prior inventive efforts of John Bachelder (who
improved on the designs of Charles Morey and Joseph B. Johnson),
Sherburne C. Blodgett and J.H. Lerow, Allen B. Wilson, and Isaac
Merritt Singer himself.223 The logjam of litigation that ensued among
Howe, Singer, and the rest of the sewing machine industry over
patent rights to the sewing machine was only broken by the creation
of the first patent pool in U.S history, the Sewing Machine
Combination,22 a commercial trust reviled in its time for charging
"ruinous" prices and employing a " 'number of lobbyists' to obtain
improper extensions of [its] patents."2 25 By the time his patent expired
in 1867, Howe had amassed more than two million in royalties
without ever manufacturing a single sewing machine.226
Morse and Bell also won patent rights only after years of
litigation. Morse's rights to the telegraph were not at all clear until
the Supreme Court ruled in his favor in 1854.227 Despite
acknowledging great inventive rivalry among "many eminent and
scientific men in Europe, as well as in this country," brought on by
widespread "belief that an electro-magnetic telegraph was
practicable,"2 " the Court upheld Morse's patent over evidence of
near-simultaneous invention in the mid-to-late 1830s by Charles
Wheatstone and Sir William Fothergill Cooke, Joseph Henry,
Edward Davy, and Carl August von Steinhiel.229
Bell likewise won patent rights to the telephone only after a
long-running legal battle that culminated in twelve days of argument
before the Supreme Court and a disposition that fills an entire
volume of the United States Reports. 230 Noting that by the time of
223. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The
Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 165, 171-82 (2011) (detailing the
various patented inventions that led to the design of the first successful sewing machine);
see also id. at 184-85 (discussing early negotiations between Howe and Singer, and Howe's
decision to pursue litigation in 1852). During litigation, attorneys for Singer discovered
prior work by a prolific inventor named Walter Hunt, who allegedly invented a sewing
machine with a shuttle and eye-point needle in 1834, ten years prior to Howe. See id. at
187.
224. See id. at 194-97.
225. See id. at 198 (quoting a "correspondent" to the Philadelphia Enquirer); see also
id. at 197 (quoting contemporary descriptions of the Sewing Machine Combination as a
"grinding, pitiless monopoly" engaging in "oppressive conduct").
226. See id. at 193.
227. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 124 (1854).
228. Id. at 107.
229. Id. at 110-11.
230. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect
Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 461-62 (2004) (recounting the rivalrous
430 [Vol. 90
HeinOnline  -- 90 N.C. L. Rev. 430 2011-2012
2012] PIONEER INVENTION DOCTRINE 431
Bell's work "[i]t had long been believed that ... the vibrations of air
caused by the voice in speaking could be reproduced at a distance by
means of electricity,"231 the Court ruled-by a single vote-that Bell's
patent held priority over the rights of numerous contemporaneous
inventors. 2 Among them were Phillip Reis, who invented a device
for reproducing tones at a distance more than a decade before Bell's
invention and named his device the "telephone," 3 Elisha Gray and
Thomas Edison, both of whom independently filed patent caveats on
or before the day Bell's application was filed, 234 and Daniel
Drawbaugh, whose claim for priority Justice Bradley called
"overwhelming" in dissent.235
These are not isolated examples. Other reputed pioneer
inventions were, in fact, independently invented by multiple
invention of the telephone, including the fact that oral argument before the Supreme
Court for The Telephone Cases "stretched over twelve days, and the report of the case fills
an entire volume of the United States Reports").
231. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 532.
232. Justices Bradley, Field, and Harlan dissented and would have awarded priority to
Daniel Drawbaugh. Id. at 573. Two Justices, Gray and Lamar, did not participate in the
case. Id. at 577. Thus, Bell won priority over Drawbaugh by a vote of four to three.
233. Id. at 539-42.
234. See Duffy, supra note 230, at 462 ("Elisha Gray ... filed a caveat for a telephone
patent on the same day that Bell filed his patent application; Thomas Edison ... began
investigating telephone technology in 1875 and filed a patent caveat one month before
Bell ..... (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 462 n.88 ("[U]nder nineteenth-century patent
practice; by filing a caveat, an inventor was entitled to notice from the Patent Office if any
other inventor filed a patent application that seemed to cover the same invention. Once he
received notice from the Patent Office, the inventor filing the caveat had three months to
file a regular patent application .... "). In fact, a number of scholars believe Bell may have
borrowed from Gray's design. See, e.g., TIM WU, THE MASTER SwITCH 18 (2010) (noting
"the testimony of a patent examiner, Zenas F. Wilbur, who admitted to accepting a $100
bribe to show Gray's design to one of Alexander Bell's lawyers").
Bell's victory was made even more improbable by the fact that Bell's application
was filed by Gardiner Hubbard, Bell's American business partner, without Bell's
knowledge. ROBERT V. BRUCE, BELL: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE
CONQUEST OF SOLITUDE 159, 168 (1990); see also GRAY, supra note 1, at 121 (noting that
Bell "was furious with Hubbard for taking matters into his own hands"). Months earlier,
Bell had arranged for his Canadian investor George Brown to file for a patent in Britain.
GRAY, supra note 1, at 121. Because filing in the United States would jeopardize his
British application, Bell promised Brown he would not apply for patent protection in the
United States until after he had been awarded a British patent. BRUCE, supra, at 159. Bell
was doubly lucky. Brown lost interest in the telephone and unilaterally chose not to file
the British application that Hubbard's miraculous U.S. filing would have imperiled.
GRAY, supra note 1, at 121. Bell later obtained a British patent and entered the British
market with another investor, William H. Reynolds. id. at 169.
235. The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. at 573 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Oddly enough, in
2002, the House of Representatives passed a resolution naming another man, the Italian-
American inventor Antonio Meucci, the inventor of the telephone. H.R. Res. 269, 107th
Cong. (2002) (enacted).
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competitors at virtually the same time. The list of well-documented
examples is long236 and includes the microscope,237 the telescope, 238
the thermometer,239 the sextant,24 the light bulb,241 radio,242
photography,2 43 television,24 4 the typewriter,2 45 the triode,246 the
236. William F. Ogburn and Dorothy Thomas identified 148 examples of independent
discovery as of the turn of the twentieth century, though many are of unpatentable natural
laws and phenomena. William F. Ogburn & Dorothy Thomas, Are Inventions Inevitable?
A Note on Social Evolution, 37 POL. SCI. Q. 83, 93-98 (1922). Robert Merton and Elinor
Barber identified 264 instances. Robert K. Merton & Elinor Barber, Singletons and
Multiples in Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 364, 364-65 (1979); see also JOSEPH ROSSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE INVENTOR: A STUDY OF THE PATENTEE 142 (2d ed. 1931) (listing twenty-eight
examples); BERNHARD J. STERN, SOCIAL FACTORS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS 111-27
(Columbia Univ. Political Sci. Dep't ed. 1927) (identifying 150 instances of multiple
invention in the medical arts); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor 8-31
(2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(discussing the surprisingly cumulative nature of fifteen "pioneering inventions").
237. Ogburn & Thomas, supra note 236, at 96 (listing Johannides, Drebbel, and Galileo
as inventors in the early seventeenth century).
238. Id. (listing four independent inventions between 1608 and 1609).
239. Id. (listing eight independent inventions between 1606 and 1617).
240. Simultaneous Discoveries Not Rare. Coincidences in History that Resemble Peary-
Cook Exploit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1909, at 9, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem
/archive-free/pdf?res=F20B11FF3F5C15738DDDABO994D1405B898CF1D3 (noting three
independent inventors between 1729 and 1731).
241. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 230, at 463 & n.94 (noting that "at least a half-dozen
researchers were seeking the invention [of the incandescent light bulb] in the late 1870s,"
including "Charles F. Brush, Moses Farmer, William E. Sawyer, Albon Man, J.W. Starr,
Hiram Maxim, Joseph W. Swan, and St. George Lane-Fox").
242. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 11, at 203-06 (discussing numerous
individuals other than Marconi who had achieved, or were close to achieving, the wireless
transmission of radio signals between 1896 and 1898, including Oliver Lodge, Nikola
Tesla, Aleksander Popov, Henry B. Jackson, and Ernest Rutherford).
243. Ogburn & Thomas, supra note 236, at 96 (listing Daguerre-Niepe and Talbot as
independent inventors of photography in 1839, and Cros and Du Hauron as independent
inventors of color photography in 1869).
244. See SAMUEL HANDEL, THE ELECTRONIC REVOLUTION 68-72 (1967)
(documenting the 1920s competition between Vladimir Zworykin and Philo T. Farnsworth
to perfect black and white television). The patent interference actions that ensued
between Zworykin and Farnsworth additionally involved priority claims by five other
inventors. See McCreary v. Zworykin, 55 F.2d 445, 447 (C.C.P.A. 1932); R.W. BURNS,
TELEVISION: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE FORMATIVE YEARS 381-82 (B.
Bowers ed. 1998). Neither was the first to build a working television system. That
accomplishment went to John Logie Baird, who conducted the first public demonstration
of televised images in London in January 1926. BURNS, supra, at 3, 163-64; WU, supra
note 234, at 136-37 (noting also that Baird was followed "[ailmost immediately" by
Charles Francis Jenkins in the United States).
245. Ogburn & Thomas, supra note 236, at 98 (listing Beach, Sholes, and Wheatstone
as independent inventors of the typewriter in the mid-nineteenth century).
246. See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 2-7 (1934) (detailing the
interference between Edwin H. Armstrong and Lee De Forest); see also GEORGE H.
DOUGLAS, THE EARLY DAYS OF RADIO BROADCASTING 12 (1987) (calling the dispute
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integrated circuit,247 the laser,248 x-ray imaging,249 the internal
combustion engine,250 the diesel engine,25' the cotton gin,252 the
reaper, 253 the steamboat,254 the airplane,255 the jet engine,256
polypropylene, 257 the reduction of aluminum, 258  and vulcanized
rubber.259
over the De Forest patent "one of the biggest and most controversial litigations in
American history").
247. See REID, supra note 221, at 110-17 (documenting the near simultaneous
independent invention of the integrated circuit by Jack Kilby (in September 1958) and
Robert Noyce (in January 1959) and the ensuing litigation between Texas Instruments and
Fairchild Semiconductor over patent rights to the invention).
248. See generally NICK TAYLOR, LASER: THE INVENTOR, THE NOBEL LAUREATE,
AND THE THIRTY-YEAR PATENT WAR (2000) (documenting the independent invention
of the laser by Gordon Gould (in November 1957) and Charles Townes and Arthur
Schawlow (in February 1958) and ensuing litigation over patent rights to the invention).
Neither was the first to create a working laser. Theodore Maiman built the first laser using
ruby crystal in 1960. See id. at 194.
249. LAMB & EASTON, supra note 2, at 173-74 (noting that A.W. Goodspeed and W.J.
Jennings took the first x-ray photograph six years before Willhelm Konrad Rontgen
"discovered" x-ray technology in 1895).
250. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 159, at 644 ("In the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, the efforts of many inventors in a number of countries developed the internal
combustion gasoline engine .... [M]any people independently thought of the idea as soon
as the most primitive gasoline engines were developed.").
251. LAMB & EASTON, supra note 2, at 126 (noting that Rudolf Diesel patented his
engine design in 1892, after H. Akroyd Stuart developed a similar design in 1890).
252. Lemley, supra note 236, at 11-12 (noting that Eli Whitney was not the only
inventor to develop a "toothed" gin in the 1790s).
253. Ogburn & Thomas, supra note 236, at 98 (listing Hussey and McCormick as
independent inventors in 1833 and 1834, respectively).
254. JACK L. SHAGENA, WHO REALLY INVENTED THE STEAMBOAT?: FULTON'S
CLERMONT COUP 113-384 (2004) (considering eight candidates: William Henry, James
Rumsey, John Fitch, Oliver Evans, Nathan Read, Samuel Morey, Robert Fulton, and John
Stevens).
255. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?,
105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1528 (2007) ("[T]he airplane ... was first patented by the
Wrights but independently developed and significantly improved upon by Glenn Curtis
and others.").
256. LAMB & EASTON, supra note 2, at 60 ("The first modern propellerless jet engines
were conceived almost simultaneously in England [by Frank Whittle] and Germany [by
Hans von Ohain and others] during the nineteen thirties.").
257. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 255, at 1528 ("[Plolypropylene ... was the subject of
a 30-year interference between competing inventors.").
258. Ogburn & Thomas, supra note 236, at 96 (listing three independent inventors
between 1885 and 1887).
259. Thomas Hancock coined the term "vulcanization" and filed for a patent in the
United Kingdom eight weeks before Charles Goodyear, though some question remains
whether Hancock's discovery was completely independent. See HAROLD EVANS ET AL.,
THEY MADE AMERICA 100 (2004) (noting that Hancock allegedly had access to rubber
samples circulated by Goodyear). See generally CHARLES SLACK, NOBLE OBSESSION:
CHARLES GOODYEAR, THOMAS HANCOCK AND THE RACE TO UNLOCK THE GREATEST
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The notion that certain valuable discoveries are not being
pursued due to insufficient patent-related incentives is simply without
empirical support. The surprisingly high incidence of near-
simultaneous independent invention of technological
breakthroughs26 should caution against extending greater rewards to
whomever ultimately wins priority at the patent office. In fact,
starting from the premise that a patentee should be rewarded with
some fraction of the social value of his invention,261 it follows that an
inventor hoping to patent an invention independently reached by
others at about the same time should receive no rights at all. When
two inventors independently make the same discovery, "each
inventor's social contribution ... is nil: the invention would have been
available to society even if [one] inventor had not discovered the
invention."262 Therefore, it could be argued, the appropriate reward
INDUSTRIAL SECRET OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2002) (setting forth the history of
the commercial development of rubber). The nascent auto-tire industry spawned
numerous instances of multiple invention, including the tubeless tire and the use of carbon
black. See LAMB & EASTON, supra note 2, at 175.
Other, non-patentable examples of multiple, independent invention include
calculus, logarithms, use of the decimal point, the periodic table, the theory of relativity,
the theory of natural selection, and the discovery of oxygen, sunspots, and the planet
Neptune. Ogburn & Thomas, supra note 236, at 93-98 (listing many more examples). See
generally Leo Corry, Jirgen Renn & John Stachel, Belated Decision in the Hilbert-Einstein
Priority Dispute, 278 SCIENCE 1270 (1997) (examining priority issues regarding whom
should be credited with conceiving the theory of relativity); Tony Rothman, Lost in
Einstein's Shadow: Einstein Gets the Glory but Others Were Paving the Way, 94 AM.
SCIENTIST 112 (2006) (providing an account of Einstein's contemporaries who did
research on the theory of relativity).
260. Indeed, many believe that "multiple discovery is not exceptional but is the normal
method by which scientific development proceeds." LAMB & EASTON, supra note 2, at ix;
see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) ("[I]f a particular
individual had not made a particular discovery others would have, and in probably a
relatively short period of time. If something is to be discovered at all very likely it will be
discovered by more than one person."); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 127 ("[I]n rapidly
advancing fields such as information technology and biotechnology,... many applied
ideas flowing from basic research are 'in the air' at any given time.").
There appear to be very few instances in which one inventor made a singular
breakthrough that was not being aggressively pursued by others. Chester Carlson's
invention of photocopying is one legitimate candidate. See Duffy, supra note 230, at 463-
64.
261. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1999-2000 (2007) (defining benchmark-level compensation as a division of the
value created by the patented invention).
262. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 116; see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 2163, 2166 (2007) ("[P]atent holders
are generally overrewarded in situations where other parties independently achieve the
same (or a similar) invention at roughly the same time .... "); Ogburn & Thomas, supra
note 236, at 85 ("If the various inventors had died in infancy, would not the inventions
have been made and would not cultural progress have gone on without much delay?").
HeinOnline  -- 90 N.C. L. Rev. 434 2011-2012
PIONEER INVENTION DOCTRINE
for whichever inventor wins priority equals the value he contributed
to society: nil.263
b. The Pioneer Doctrine's Ex Ante Effect Is De Minimis
Even if history did not dispute the existence of truly pioneering
inventions, the pioneer doctrine's impact on inventors' ex ante
incentives is likely quite small. As an extension of the doctrine of
equivalents, the pioneer doctrine primarily acts to expand the
inventor's claim scope to capture new applications or improvements
that the inventor could not have foreseen at the time she filed her
patent application. It goes without saying that an inventor's ex ante
incentive to invent will not be greatly enhanced by the possibility that
years later her patent rights will possibly expand to cover some as-of-
yet unforeseen future development. The doctrine's effect on a
potential inventor's pre-invention decision making is diminished by a
number of contingencies: the invention might never be adopted by
the public; it might not lend itself to improvements; it might lend itself
only to foreseeable improvement; it might give rise to unforeseeable
improvements that the inventor has a natural advantage developing;
or it might give rise to improvements so advanced that the reverse
doctrine of equivalents will apply to take ownership away from the
inventor regardless.26 In other words, viewed ex ante, the pioneer
doctrine is so unlikely to matter that it could have at most a de
minimis impact on innovation.2 65 Far more likely to spur
groundbreaking innovation are the many natural advantages,
discussed above, that pioneers have over their late-comer
competitors.266
Empirical evidence shows that even drastic increases in the
potential breadth of patent scope may not induce much additional
263. Though few, if any, scholars would champion this line of argument to such an
extreme, many have argued in favor of an independent invention defense that would
permit independent inventors to practice their invention without fear of suit by an
unknown prior inventor. See generally Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a
Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006) (arguing that independent
invention should be a defense against patent infringement).
264. See Merges, supra note 97, at 102 (making a similar point).
265. But cf Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics
for the Common Good, 16 GEO.-MASON L. REV. 141 passim (2008) (analyzing the so-
called "lottery effect" in patent law that leads many inventors to overestimate their
likelihood of obtaining a very lucrative patent).
266. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 878 n.163 ("[R]educing scope at the
margin will not completely eliminate the advantages of a pioneering invention over an
improvement. Even without patents, pioneering inventions can lead to much higher
returns than mere improvements.").
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innovation. In 1988, Japan passed patent reform legislation allowing
inventors to file multi-claim patent applications for the first time.2 67
Before that time, Japanese patents were strictly limited to one
claim.2 68 Despite drastically increasing patentees' ability to claim
near-equivalent embodiments of their inventions, these patent
reforms failed to increase R&D spending or innovative output in
Japan. 69
2. Broad Pioneer Scope Discourages Innovation Ex Post
Just as there is no evidence that broad protection for pioneer
patents spurs more innovation ex ante, there is also no evidence that
broad pioneer patent scope facilitates the continued development and
commercialization of inventions ex post. To the contrary, economic
insight and historical experience suggest that broad pioneer patent
rights impede, rather than hasten, the improvement and
dissemination of valuable new inventions, which are often more
important and commercially valuable than the early inventions on
which they build.270
a. Dominant Firms Hold Up Improvers, Rather than
Coordinate
Unlike the hypothetical coordinating firms of Kitch's prospect
theory, history shows that firms achieving near monopoly over an
industry with broad patent rights have not been good stewards of
their intellectual property. 271 As discussed further below, pioneer
267. These reforms also included a term extension of up to five years for
pharmaceutical inventions. Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents
Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND
J. ECON. 77, 78-79 (2001).
268. Id. at 79.
269. Id. at 98-99.
270. Christopher D. Hazuka, Supporting the Work of Lesser Geniuses: An Argument
for Removing Obstructions to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 57 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 157, 188 (2002) ("[A]lthough pioneer inventions may be technologically or creatively
impressive, it may be the improvements that are commercially successful."); Lemley, supra
note 73, at 997 (" '[I]mprovements' may in many cases dwarf the original work in terms of
their practical significance .... "); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District:
Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 373 n.54 (1992) ("A
study of the history of innovations in almost any field will show the key importance of
improvement inventions.").
271. A patent "monopoly," of course, does not guarantee a monopoly in the true sense.
See Alan Devlin, The Stochastic Relationship Between Patents and Antitrust, 5 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 75, 112 (2009) ("[Pjatents rarely grant a monopoly in antitrust
terms-that is, a patent will rarely cover a product that is of such unique value that no
substitutes exist for it at competitive price levels . . . ."). Nevertheless, a number of firms
436 [Vol. 90
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firms tend to rest on their laurels or narrowly focus on one part of
their technological "prospect" where they have expertise while
ignoring other areas that might also be profitable.27 2 For example,
within a decade of perfecting the steam engine, James Watt wrote to
his partner James Boulton:
On the whole I find it is now full time to cease attempting to
invent new things, or to attempt anything which is attended
with any risk of not succeeding, or of creating trouble in the
execution. Let us go on executing the things we understand, and
leave the rest to younger men, who have neither money nor
character to lose.273
Indeed, some commentators have argued that large dominant
firms by their very nature are ill suited to innovate. 274 Further, instead
of liberally licensing their patent rights to upstart competitors,
dominant firms may instead engage in rent-seeking activities aimed at
protecting their dominant market shares. 275 Thomas Edison, for
have achieved near-monopoly status in certain industries by exercising broad patent rights.
See Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL'Y 273, 275 (1998) (noting,
in particular, AT&T's near monopoly on telephone service and General Electric and
Westinghouse's near monopoly on light bulb production).
272. Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 872-73; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 620 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed. 1962)
("[Plreinvention monopoly power acts as a strong disincentive to further innovation.").
273. F.M. Scherer, Invention and Innovation in the Watt-Boulton Steam-Engine
Venture, 6 TECH. & CULTURE 165, 174 (1965) (quoting Letter from James Watt to
Matthew Boulton (Nov. 5, 1785)). Watt conceived of a steam engine with a "separate
condensing vessel" in 1765, but did not perfect his improved design until after joining
forces with Boulton in 1774. See id. at 167-69.
274. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent
Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987, 1022-26
(2000); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry:
The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 825 (noting that a large
firm's "hierarchical structure and culture may be inimical to innovation, or at least inimical
to radical innovation"). On the innovative advantages small firms have over their large
counterparts, see generally ZOLTAN J. ACS & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND
SMALL FIRMS (1990).
275. See MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND
INNOVATION 29-30 (1982) ("[T]he firm presently realizing monopoly profits may be less
motivated to seek additional profits than the one earning only normal profits.... [This is
because] it may become more concerned with protecting its current monopoly position
than acquiring a new one."). These activities may include suppressing superior
technologies. See Wu, supra note 234, at 126-35 (discussing RCA's efforts in the 1930s and
1940s to dissuade Edwin Armstrong from further developing FM radio because it
threatened the large networks then dominating the AM airwaves); Mark Clark,
Suppressing Innovation: Bell Laboratories and Magnetic Recording, 34 TECH. & CULTURE
516, 530-37 (1993) (detailing Bell Labs and AT&T's efforts in the late 1930s and 1940s to
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example, transitioned in less than a decade from pioneer of
incandescent lighting "to a staunch opponent of the 'dangerous'
innovation of alternating current." 2 76
We need not rehash the entire history of innovation, however, to
see that it is impractical to expect pioneers and improvers to
coordinate the development of existing technology. Simple economic
intuition dictates that when an opportunity to develop an
improvement arises, pioneers and improvers will frequently fail to
reach an agreement, especially when the improvement at issue is of
high value.
The reason is simple: the pioneer patent holder can use his
patent rights to hold up the improver for much of the value of the
proposed improvement. Consider a numerical example.277 Assume
that a pioneer inventor holds patent rights covering a product that
nets the pioneer $100 in profits per sale. Predictably, the pioneer is
unable on his own to imagine and develop all possible improvements
to his patented product. Luckily, an improver foresees a valuable
improvement to the pioneer's technology that he believes could be
embodied in an improved version of the pioneer's product that will
net a much larger profit of $1,000 per sale. Because the improver
cannot produce his product without infringing the pioneer's patent,
the improver must receive the pioneer's permission to move forward
with production. That is, the improver must offer the pioneer at least
some portion of the $900 surplus created by his improvement to bring
his idea to fruition. Assuming the parties have approximately even
bargaining power and agree to split the surplus evenly, the improver
is left with just $450 of reward for his improvement, while the pioneer
accrues $550 of the total allocation. 278 Thus, even in a Coasean world
suppress the development of magnetic recording technology for everyday home use
because they "feared that the availability of a recording device would make customers less
willing to use the telephone system"); Richard Dunford, The Suppression of Technology as
a Strategy for Controlling Resource Dependence, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 512, 516 (1987)
(discussing, among others, General Electric's suppression of fluorescent lighting, and
various oil companies' alleged suppression of solar energy technology).
276. Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 872 n.141.
277. This example is substantially borrowed from Merges, supra note 97, at 79-81, and
Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 866 n.117.
278. This negotiation will likely be impacted by the intellectual property rights held by
the respective parties. In some situations, particularly when the original inventor's rights
are broad and the improvement is relatively small, the improver may not be able to secure
a patent covering the improvement. In these cases, the improver is simply an infringer and
has bargaining power only because he is aware of the improvement and the original
inventor is not. To bargain effectively, such improvers must overcome "Arrow's paradox
of information," which refers to the fact that in order to sell information a seller must
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without transactions costs, broad patent rights covering an invention
significantly reduce potential improvers' incentives to invest in
further developing that invention.
The real word, of course, is not Coasean and, accordingly,
transactions costs and strategic behavior will further conspire to sink
many potential deals between existing patentees and improvers,
unfortunately causing many valuable improvements to sit unused for
years until their predecessors' patents expire.279 One major
impediment to licensing between original inventors and improvers is
divergent views of the value of the improvement. In the numerical
example above, both the original patentee and improver agree that
the improvement creates a $900 surplus. In the real world, it is
extraordinarily difficult to assess ex ante just how valuable a
particular piece of technology will be.280 The history of modern
technology is littered with examples of wildly inaccurate assessments.
Marconi and Deforest, for example, predicted that radio would be
disclose his information to the potential buyer, who now possessing the information no
longer needs to purchase it. Arrow, supra note 272, at 614-16. Trade secret law offers a
partial solution, as do contractual provisions prohibiting the disclosure of certain
information. See Lemley, supra note 73, at 1052 n.289. Often, however, the improvement
will be independently patentable. In these situations, the original inventor and the
improver are said to have "blocking patents." See Merges, supra note 97, at 80. The
original inventor can block the improver from selling a product embodying his basic
invention, but the improver can likewise block the original inventor from selling a product
embodying his new improvement. Id.
279. Some economists theorize that rational strategic behavior alone can lead to a
bargaining breakdown even when a positive surplus is on the table. See, e.g., Robert
Cooter & Stephen Marks, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 243 (1982) ("Rationality requires the players
to adopt strategies in which they risk destroying the surplus in order to gain a larger share
of the stakes in the event of settlement."). Fields in which bargaining breakdown delayed
the adoption of valuable improvements include steelmaking, see Merges, supra note 97, at
87-88 (discussing how blocking patents long delayed integration of the Bessemer-Kelly
blast furnace and Robert Mushnet's alloying compound speigeleisen), and chemical textile
coloring, see BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 11, at 91 (discussing Baadische Chemical
Company's inability to understand and implement Levinstein & Company's improved
chemical process after winning an injunction against Levinstein in England). On the
general topic of incumbent patentees' ability to exclude start-up competitors from the
market, see Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1588 (2009); Stuart
J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1063, 1080-81 (2008).
280. Lemley, supra note 73, at 1053 ("[Wlhile the parties ideally would base the cost of
a license on the value of the right licensed, that value will likely be difficult to determine
accurately in the case of unique goods like intellectual property rights. This problem is
exacerbated in the context of licensing potential improvements, since if it is hard to value
an invention that has already been made, it is well-nigh impossible to value one that might
be made in the future.").
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used only for point-to-point communication; neither foresaw
commercial broadcasting as a viable application.281 IBM likewise
failed to foresee that there would be a commercial market for
computers.282 And the transistor was expected to make a splash
primarily in the hearing aid market. 283
Many commentators have also noted that difficulty in valuing the
technological contribution of an improvement can lead inventors'
emotional ties to their inventions to make their assessments diverge
even further. Original inventors may be prone to assert a moral claim
over the improvement, while an improver may tend to view her
contribution as the keystone without which the technology would be
worthless? If the addition of uncertainty and ego into the example
above causes the original inventor to estimate that the improvement
will net just $700 in additional profit and the improver to
overestimate the surplus as $1,100, the parties may well fail to reach a
bargain because neither will be willing to accept what the other views
as a fair offer.285
Finally, transactions costs will deplete the potential surplus of
some percentage of potential licenses. The negotiation of patent
licenses is notoriously expensive, with some estimating costs at twenty
percent of the total royalty payment.28 6 To obtain a license, a
281. See DOUGLAS, supra note 246, at 2 ("[In 1920,] RCA ... wasn't the slightest bit
interested in radio broadcasting as we think of it today."); Lemley, supra note 73, at 1050
n.281.
282. See Merges, supra note 97, at 86 n.41.
283. See Lemley, supra note 73, at 1050 n.281. Other examples include the VCR, which
was initially marketed to TV stations for airing reruns, see Merges, supra note 97, at 86
n.42, and the telephone, which was initially viewed as a curiosity that would never replace
the telegraph, see GRAY, supra note 1, at 129 (quoting a Western Union electrician, who
wrote that the "telephone has too many shortcomings to be seriously considered as a
means of communication" and had "no value to us."); Wu, supra note 234, at 25 (noting
that Western Union turned down Bell's offer to sell his telephone patents for $100,000).
284. See Merges, supra note 97, at 90-91. Further, original inventors may refuse to
license their rights to potential improvers for any number of other "irrational" reasons.
Lemley, supra note 73, at 1060-61. See generally Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher
Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011) (showing the existence of an
additional, distinct "creativity effect"); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman,
Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010)
(demonstrating the existence of an "endowment effect" even in transactions involving
non-rival creative works).
285. See Lemley, supra note 73, at 1055-56 (developing a similar example). Assuming
equal bargaining power, the improver will view an offer of $550 as a reasonable division,
whereas the original inventor will aim to settle for about $350 per unit. See id. at 1062
(describing a similar hypothetical).
286. DAVID J. TEECE, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE RESOURCE
COST OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 43-44 (1976); see also FAROK J.
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potential improver must determine what existing technology rights he
needs to license, find out who owns those rights, and negotiate a
royalty payment. None of these steps is trivial. The PTO has issued
more than 140,000 patents per year since 1998 and inventors have
filed more than 450,000 new applications each year since 2007.2" To
even determine whom to approach, an improver would theoretically
have to review the many thousands of patents issued in his industry in
the previous two decades and, even if an improver paid to search for
and review all relevant existing patents, it is unlikely he would be able
to say with any certainty exactly which patents he should license
because it is extraordinarily difficult to determine the scope of patent
claims.288 Further, licenses themselves are frequently complex
agreements drafted by lawyers, and many specify ongoing royalty
payments that impose additional monitoring costs on both parties.289
b. Pioneer Patents by Industry
Combining historical results with economic intuition, it becomes
even more apparent that broad pioneer rights hinder innovation,
regardless of market characteristics. As noted above, several scholars
have suggested that the pioneer doctrine might play a beneficial role
in at least some markets.2 90 However, the pioneer doctrine is unlikely
to spur innovation in any industry. In two broad
categories-industries in which innovation is primarily cumulative or
competitive-the costs of the pioneer doctrine certainly exceed its
CONTRACTOR, INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 101-05 (1981) (finding costs
of $192,000 per transaction in a study of seventy-three transactions between U.S. licensors
and international licensees located in countries with "industrialized-market economies").
287. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2010, supra note 90.
288. See Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent
Infringement Deterrent, 74 Mo. L. REV. 909, 936-39 (2009). Even if patent claims were
always written in the plainest language, no amount of analysis can protect an improver
from a patentee with "a continuation application waiting in the wings" to capture her
improvement. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 25, at 78, 82.
289. See Lemley, supra note 73, at 1053 (citing JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §§ 1.01(2), 1.04(1) (1996)).
290. Merges and Nelson, and Burk and Lemley have studied patent law's effects across
industries. Merges and Nelson categorized industries as discrete, cumulative, chemical, or
"science-based." Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 880. Burk and Lemley matched
industries with five economic theories of patent protection: prospect theory, competitive
innovation, cumulative innovation, anticommons theory, and patent thickets. Burk &
Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 9, at 1615-30. The analysis that follows merges the
analysis of both studies and considers cumulative, competitive, discrete, and the
pharmaceutical/biomedical industries. The analysis of the pharmaceutical and biomedical
industries draws from Merges and Nelson's insights on the chemical and science-based
industries, as well as Burk and Lemley's analysis of industries that map to the
anticommons and patent thicket theories.
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benefits. In a third, those where innovation is discrete, the doctrine
will have virtually no effect. Finally, contrary to the most recent calls
for the pioneer doctrine's revival, the pioneer doctrine is unlikely to
benefit even the pharmaceutical and biomedical industries.
i. Cumulative
In many industries, virtually all innovation builds incrementally
upon existing technology. This type of "cumulative" advance is the
norm, for example, in industries that produce complex products made
from many components, many of which themselves are quite
complicated and composed of many subparts.2 9' Such products
include cars, airplanes, and computer hardware.2" Due to the
technological complexity inherent in these industries, innovation
tends to advance not as the result of sweeping paradigm shifts but
rather as the result of improvements to discrete components or the
introduction of new components. Thus, extending broad patent rights
to an early pioneer inventor of a complex system confers substantial
power on the inventor to control a large technological prospect. As a
result, the inability or unwillingness of the pioneer to license to
potential improvers hoping to advance any one of the many
components can effectively freeze innovation in the industry for
years.
Historical evidence bears out that in cumulative industries the
inability of dominant pioneers and improvers to coordinate has
hampered growth in many areas. The early market for electrical
lighting provides one such example.293 Once validated in 1891,
Edison's pioneering incandescent lamp patent gave Edison's
company (which would later become General Electric) a near
monopoly on incandescent lamp production.29 4 Instead of
coordinating with competitors to further develop lighting technology,
Edison used his patent rights to quickly eliminate as much
competition as possible. Between 1891 and 1894, Edison's market
291. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 881-82, 884-97 (discussing "cumulative"
industries and the ekfect of broad patent scope in such industries).
292. Id. at 881.
293. Id. at 885-88 (detailing General Electric's domination of the nascent electrical
lighting industry).
294. Edison Elec. Light Co. v. U.S. Elec. Lighting Co., 52 F. 300, 314 (2d Cir. 1892)
(affirming the Southern District of New York's 1891 ruling upholding the validity of
Edison's U.S. Patent No. 223,898).
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share grew from forty to seventy-five percent.295 At the same time, the
rate of innovation in the industry slowed to a standstill. With the
market secured, Edison turned his attention to other inventions.296
Not until after Edison's pioneering patent expired and the company's
market share began to decline did General Electric begin to invest in
improving its lamp technology.29
Watt's domination of the late-eighteenth century market for
steam engines in the United Kingdom is a similar story. Initially
awarded patent rights in 1769, Watt made little effort to produce an
engine until 1775 when, thanks to the political connections of his
business partner Matthew Boulton, Parliament extended Watt's
patent rights to 1800.298 With his rights extended, Watt asserted his
patent aggressively against rivals, thwarting the efforts of improvers
like Jonathan Hornblower, who invented a more efficient "compound
engine" with two cylinders, and Richard Trevithick, inventor of the
"high pressure" steam engine. 299 Evidence that Watt's broad patent
rights delayed, rather than spurred, the industrial revolution is quite
convincing. During the term of Watt's patent, the United Kingdom
added just 750 horsepower of engine capacity per year and made little
improvement in engine fuel capacity.3" After Watt's rights expired
and improved engines became available, that rate jumped to more
than 4,000 horsepower annually and fuel efficiency quintupled.o1
295. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 885-86 (citing ARTHUR A. BRIGHT, JR.,
THE ELECTRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FROM 1800 TO 1947, at 91-92 (1949)).
296. See ARTHUR A. BRIGHT, JR., THE ELECTRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY:
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FROM 1800 TO 1947, at 122
(1949).
297. Id. at 138-39.
298. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 11, at 1.
299. Id. at 3-4, 12 n.5. Perhaps appropriately so, Watt's engine was less efficient than it
could have been because Watt was unable to license James Pickard's patented "crank and
flywheel" and, thus, had to improvise his own alternative gear. Id. at 2.
300. Id. at 1.
301. Id. To give one more example, in the earliest days of radio, Marconi Wireless and
Telegraph Company, which dominated the industry with its patent on the diode, refused
to license its rights to AT&T, which hoped to produce radio equipment using the newly-
invented triode. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 891-93 (detailing the conflict in
the early radio industry among Marconi, AT&T, General Electric, Westinghouse, and
other companies). As a result, the triode sat unused for a number of years until just after
World War I, when the U.S. Navy facilitated the consolidation of the radio industry's
fundamental patent rights in the newly formed Radio Corporation of America ("RCA").
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMtSSION ON THE
RADIO INDUSTRY: IN RESPONSE TO HOUSE RESOLUTION 548, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., Dec.
1, 1923, at 18-21, 26-27 (1924).
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Pioneers have used their patents in other ways to impede the
progress of other cumulative technology industries. Selden, the
pioneer inventor of the gasoline-powered internal combustion
engine,302 never again sought to advance improvement in the
automobile industry and instead devoted his efforts exclusively to
extracting royalties from those, including Henry Ford, who did.303
Taking the opposite approach, the Wright brothers sought to advance
the aircraft industry single-handedly and fought tooth and nail to
exclude other legitimate innovators from the market until the
Secretary of the Navy intervened during World War I to force
cross-licensing."'
In contrast to these examples, innovation has often been rapid in
industries without a powerful pioneer. The rise of the computer
industry in the twentieth century, for example, may be attributable in
part to the fact that the industry narrowly dodged single firm
domination at two pivotal moments in its history: first, when an
antitrust suit filed shortly after the invention of the transistor forced
AT&T to license its patent rights at low rates0 5 and, second, when
Texas Instruments and Fairchild Semiconductor each denied the
other sole control of the integrated circuit by winning patent rights
covering basic aspects of that technology.306
ii. Competitive
In other industries, innovation occurs without widespread use of
the patent system. In these industries, competition in the
marketplace-usually in conjunction with other factors like relatively
low R&D costs and powerful first mover advantages-is a sufficient
302. Selden, a patent attorney by trade, kept his patent in prosecution for sixteen years.
When it finally issued (much to the surprise of the maturing automobile industry), John
Seymour, the Commissioner of Patents, dubbed it "the pioneer invention in the
application of the compression gas engine to road or horseless carriage use." See WILLIAM
GREENLEAF, MONOPOLY ON WHEELS: HENRY FORD AND THE SELDEN AUTOMOBILE
PATENT 38, 49-50 (1961).
303. See id. at 106-11 (detailing Selden's efforts to assert his rights against Ford and
others); see also BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 11, at 84 ("Once Selden's patent, no.
549,160, was awarded, it commanded royalties of 1.25 percent on the sale value of every
automobile sold in the United States.").
304. Merges & Nelson, supra note 28,890-91 (citing Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co.,
204 F. 597,614 (W.D.N.Y. 1913), affd, 211 F. 654 (2d Cir. 1914)).
305. Id. at 893-94 (citing Richard C. Levin, The Semiconductor Industry, in
GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS 76 (Richard Nelson ed., 1982)).
306. See generally REID, supra note 221 (discussing the history of both Texas
Instruments and Fairchild Semiconductor and their role in developing the integrated
circuit).
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spur to innovation. 0 For example, a number of industries
experienced a great deal of innovation in past eras when discoveries
in related fields were thought to be unpatentable. Business methods
were not considered patentable subject matter until 1998, yet firms
have always sought to operate as efficiently as possible.308 Likewise,
the early development of software does not appear to have been
impacted by the perennially uncertain status of software as patentable
subject matter.3 09 To the contrary, many attribute the rapid growth of
the Internet in part to the open, collaborative culture in which it was
developed."0
In these industries the efficacy of any patent protection, let alone
broad pioneer patent rights, is highly doubtful. When only modest
incentives are necessary to spur innovation and sufficiently large
incentives are inherent in the market, even modest patent protection
307. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 9, at 1617-19 (discussing
"competitive innovation" and industries that operate without substantial reliance on the
patent system).
308. Id. at 1618; see also ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 155 (2d ed.
1997) ("[T]he relatively frequent innovations in the financial services industry prior to the
era of patentability suggest that firms had adequate means to appropriate the value of
their new financial innovations."). But cf John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1251-52 (2011) (observing that interest in patenting business
methods arose only after the rate of innovation in business and finance began to increase
sharply in the latter half of the twentieth century).
309. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 9, at 1618-19; see also BOLDRIN &
LEVINE, supra note 11, at 17-21 (noting the success of open source software); id. at 16
("[I]f people had understood how patents would be granted when most of today's ideas
were invented, and had taken out patents, the industry would be at a complete standstill
today." (quoting Bill Gates, CEO Microsoft Corporation) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). In fact, empirical evidence suggests that even today many software firms
consider patents to be of limited importance. See Graham et al., supra note 218, at 1262
(finding that the majority of start-up companies in the software industry hold no patents at
all). Agricultural seeds and plant varieties, which were not patentable until 1970, provide
yet another example. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 11, at 52-57, 80-84.
310. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 9, at 1619 ("[T]he open,
nonproprietary nature of the Internet is directly responsible for the dramatic innovation it
fostered in the 1990s."). See generally BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET
ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2010) (focusing on the open architecture of the
Internet). Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman have identified a number of quite
innovative industries that seldom rely on intellectual property protection. See Kal
Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1774 (2006) (focusing primarily on the
fashion industry, but also noting innovation in football strategy, magic, and fireworks); Kal
Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Creative Cocktail: A Guest Post, FREAKONOMICS
(Dec. 23, 2010, 11:30 AM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/the-creative-
cocktail-a-guest-post/ (cocktail recipes); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The
Vigilantes of Comedy: A Guest Post, FREAKONOMICS (Mar. 30, 2010, 2:00 PM),
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/the-vigilantes-of-comedy-a-guest-post/
(stand-up comedy).
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will impede innovation. Broad pioneer patent rights will only serve as
a greater impediment. This is especially true because the pace of
innovation in competitive industries, which have relatively low R&D
costs, is particularly rapid.3 1' Broad rights, therefore, may allow a
pioneer to hold up multiple generations of later-developed
technology.3 12
iii. Discrete
In yet another group of industries, competitors primarily sell
simple, stand-alone products that neither incorporate many
components nor serve themselves as components of a larger product.
Examples include the razor, pen, toy, and packaging industries.3 13
Inventions in these areas are circumscribed and do not lend
themselves to radical improvement. 3 14 Thus technology advances via
the introduction of wholly new products rather than through the
incremental improvement of existing products.
Accordingly, granting especially broad patent scope is unlikely to
either hinder or advance innovation. Broad rights will not discourage
valuable improvements because there are none to discourage. And
broad rights will not incentivize further innovation because inventors
are fully protected so long as their patent rights are broad enough to
prevent competitors from introducing copycat products.
iv. Biopharmaceuticals
Finally, contrary to recent scholarship calling for the pioneer
doctrine's return in the pharmaceutical and biomedical industries, a
close examination of these two fields-which, increasingly, are
merging into one biopharmaceutical industry 315-shows that even
here broad pioneer rights are unlikely to spur additional innovation.
311. For example, innovation in the computer industry has generally conformed to
Moore's Law, which states that computing power will double approximately every two
years. See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,
ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 1965, at 114, 115.
312. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 193, at 39 (arguing that "[b]ecause software
patents have a short effective life" broad claim scope "will give holders of software patents
control over many more generations of improvements than patentees in other industries").
313. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 880-81 (discussing "discrete" industries
and identifying examples).
314. Id. at 880 ("[I]t is implicit that [discrete] invention does not point the way to wide
ranging subsequent technical advances. It does not define any broad prospect.").
315. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 11, at 222 ("As of 2004, already more than
half of the research projects carried out in the pharmaceutical industry had some
biomedical foundation.").
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First, commentators calling for broader patent rights for
pharmaceutical and biomedical inventions ignore the fact that patent
law already allows inventors in these areas to file extraordinarily
broad claims at an early stage of their research. As discussed above,
patent law traditionally allows the first inventor of a purified version
of a natural substance to claim the purified product itself and not
simply the method she used to produce it. This rule has allowed
inventors to claim ownership of actual hormones, proteins, genes,316
and cells317 used for medical diagnostics and treatment-not merely
the processes used to produce those substances in a lab. Courts also
permit inventors to claim pharmaceuticals even if they do not know
or understand why the treatment works and even if they do not know
for sure that the treatment will work as disclosed."' Thus, even
without the assistance of the pioneer doctrine, patent law ensures that
many early pharmaceutical and biomedical inventors will control a
broad prospect in need of further development.319
Pioneer doctrine proponents also focus on the high cost of
pharmaceutical R&D and, in particular, the long delay in
commercialization caused by the FDA approval process. But the pace
of biomedical research is increasing at a stunning rate. Researchers
predict that they will soon be able to decode a human genome-a
process that used to take years-in a matter of minutes.3 20 In fact, new
316. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
317. See infra notes 336-42 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
319. Contrary to the assumptions of many pioneer doctrine proponents, other
commentators have observed that there is little evidence that innovation in the biotech
field is hindered by splintered ownership of patent rights. See E. Richard Gold & Julia
Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12 GENETICS MED. S39, S66
(2010) ("Given that genes have a great variety of applications ... one would expect higher
level of patents blocking research than in other fields. This has not, however, been
documented with good empirical data.").
320. See Boonsri Dickinson, The Jiffy Lube of Genome Decoding, DISCOVER MAG.,
Oct. 2008, at 48, available at http://discovermagazine.com/2008/oct/20-jiffy-lube-of-genome
-decoding ("It cost nearly $3 billion and took 13 years to sequence the first human genome
.... Today it would price out at about $350,000 and take a few months. But Pacific
Biosciences in Menlo Park, California, says that as early as 2013 it will have the technology
to map all of a person's DNA in just a few minutes and for mere hundreds of dollars.");
see also Nicholas Wade, Cost of Decoding a Genome Is Lowered, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
2009, at D3 ("[Tihe much-discussed goal of the $1,000 genome could be attained in two or
three years. That is the cost, experts have long predicted, at which genome sequencing
could start to become a routine part of medical practice."); Marcus Wohisen, Stanford
Prof Sequences Own Genome in Weeks, SEATELE TIMES (Aug. 11, 2009),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmlnationworld/2009634081_apusfastergenescan.html?
syndication= ("It might not be long until there is a gene scanner in every doctor's office, as
DNA sequencing becomes faster and cheaper. A Stanford University professor [Stephen
2012] 447
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genetic tests are generally available to patients before the patents
covering those tests issue. For example, sixty percent of laboratories
began conducting tests for hereditary haemochromatosis within
fourteen months of publication of the isolated HFE gene.321
Moreover, many promising areas of biomedical research are subject
to a truncated FDA approval process or subject to no approval
process at all.322 Also, advances in so-called "personalized medicine"
may soon allow pharmaceutical companies to revive already
developed drugs that failed to win FDA approval for use by the
general public (or were subsequently pulled from the market) to be
sold to specific genetic populations for whom they are safe."
Arguments for rejuvenating the pioneer doctrine for
pharmaceutical and biomedical inventions also fail to take into
account that core advances in these fields are seldom incentivized by
the patent system. Many inventions patented in these areas can be
directly linked to discoveries made by researchers working in the
natural sciences.32 4 Frequently, these discoveries open up a number of
new technological possibilities and set off a rush among others to
patent the many practical applications now "in the air."" Because
R. Quake] reported Monday that he has sequenced his entire genome in a few weeks for
under $50,000 using a single machine.").
321. Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents Are
Illustrated by the Case of Haemochromatosis, 415 NATURE 577, 578 (2002).
322. See Gold & Carbone, supra note 319, at S42 ("[D]iagnostic products and services
[can] be put on the market relatively quickly ... [because they do] not hav[e] to undergo
clinical trials in the United States .... "); Lisa L. Ouellette, Note, Access to Bio-
Knowledge: From Gene Patents to Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV., [ 57
(2010), available at http://stlr.stanford.edulpdflouellette-access-to-bio-knowledge.pdf ("No
FDA-approval is needed for genetic tests...."). But cf. Rita Rubin, FDA Groups Genetic
Tests with Medical Devices, Requiring Approval, USA TODAY, June 15, 2010, at 7D
(explaining that the FDA's stance on some genetic testing has changed).
323. See Turna Ray, Big Pharma's Drug Failure May Be Small Personalized Rx Firm's
Gain, PGx Researcher Says, GENOMEWEB PHARMACOGENOMICS REP. (Oct. 7, 2009),
http://www.genomeweb.com/dxpgx/big-pharmas-drug-failure-may-be-small-personalized-
rx-firms-gain-pgx-researcher-.
324. See ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, SCIENCE AND INNOVATION: THE US
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY DURING THE 1980s 14 (1995) ("The generation of new
drugs depends in large measure on the activities that occur at the outset of the R&D
process. Early research stages play a more meaningful role than in other industries, and
they are the most creative steps of the drug innovation cycle."); GOOZNER, supra note
144, at 8 ("[T]he inception of drugs which have truly made a difference in recent years ...
can almost always be found in the vast biomedical research enterprise funded by the
federal government.").
325. In a study of all U.S. patent interferences filed between 1980 and 1994, William
Kingston found that two patent classes covering pharmaceutical inventions (Nos. 424 and
514) accounted for one-eighth of all interferences. William Kingston, Light on
Simultaneous Invention from U.S. Patent Office "Interference" Records, 26 WORLD PAT.
448 [Vol. 90
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advances in pure science are not patentable,326 these fundamental
discoveries could not have been encouraged by the prospect of
obtaining patent rights.
Moreover, many biomedical patents are issued to universities
hoping to monetize the inventive efforts of their faculty and
students. 32 7 University-affiliated inventors tend to be motivated more
by publication, tenure, accolades from their colleagues, and grades or
graduation requirements (for students) than by a desire to see their
work patented and commercialized.328 More importantly, the vast
majority of biomedical and pharmaceutical research conducted at
universities is funded by the U.S. government, with some estimating
that private industry picks up less than one-third of the cost.329 In
INFO. 209, 212-13 (2004). Kingston attributed the predominance of interference in the
chemical arts in part to "common sources of basic research information, such as what may
be disclosed at specialist Conferences." Id. at 220; see also id. at 217 ("The number of
chemical patent applications ... is especially high after important conferences dealing with
specific issues. Many firms get ideas from these conferences and eventually file similar
patent applications .... "); Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 883-84, 904-08 (discussing
"science-based industries" and noting that "new scientific and technological developments
'in the air' open the possibility of a major advance over prior practice, and the
contribution made by the individual or firm who first makes these possibilities operational
may be relatively small"). See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONs 35-42 (1962) (conceptualizing scientific progress as a series of
"paradigms," during which much of innovation is merely "puzzle-solving").
326. See, e.g., Armour Pharm. Co. v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 396 F.2d 70, 72 (3d Cir.
1968) ("It has long been a principle of patent law that the discovery of a law of nature
cannot form the basis of a patent.").
327. Brief of Amici Curiae the Regents of the University of California et al. on En
Banc Rehearing in Support of Affirmance of Judgment, supra note 146, at 22
("Universities and other research institutions have been pioneers in advancing the
biotechnology arts, including recombinant DNA technology, stem cell research, hepatitis
B vaccine and many other inventions."); John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology
Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50
EMORY L.J. 101, 109 (2001) ("[T]he multi-billion dollar system of investment, mostly
public and mostly university-based ... provides most of the researchers and basic research
that drives modern biotechnology.").
328. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 182 (1987); Hazuka, supra note 270, at 196
("[A]cademic scientists, who have driven the revolutionary advances in biomedical
science, are not generally motivated by the possibility of obtaining patents. Instead, they
seek publication and the esteem of their peers. Indeed, much biotechnology upstream,
basic research would take place in the absence of the patent system."); Arti K. Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 89-90 (1999) (observing that norms in the scientific research
community "promote a public domain of freely available scientific information" and
eschew "claiming property rights in invention ... as immoral").
329. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 11, at 239-40 (relying on statistics from 1995); see
also GOOZNER, supra note 144, at 8 ("Taxpayer-financed medical research, whether in
NIH labs or through government grants to academic and nonprofit medical centers,
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1985, the Bayh-Dole Act for the first time authorized universities to
patent the results of federally funded university research.330 Since that
time, universities have obtained thousands of patents per year,3 3'
excluding the public from the benefits of research that was
incentivized ex ante with funds from the public coffers.332 Further,
studies show that universities are ill equipped to license their patent
rights, as very few universities profit from their patent licensing
programs.333
reached $27 billion in 2003, almost equal to industry spending .... Over the years, NIH-
funded research played not only the key role in virtually all of the basic scientific
breakthroughs that underpin modern medicine but also a central role in the application of
those findings to the search for many new therapies."); U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP.
OFFICE, OVERVIEW OF THE UK NATIONAL STEM CELL NETWORK PATENT WATCH
LANDSCAPE 13 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.uknscn.org/downloads/patent
.analysis_0811.pdf (studying all stem cell-related patents granted by the IPO between
November 2008 and October 2009, and finding that forty percent (38 of 95) were issued to
universities); Gold & Carbone, supra note 319, at S48 (noting that the National Institutes
of Health "has funded part of virtually every major U.S. biomedical research project at
some stage"); Anna Schissel et al., Survey Confirms Fears About Licensing of Genetic
Tests, 402 NATURE 118, 118 (1999) (finding that sixty-seven percent of genetic patents
issued in the United States resulted from research funded by the U.S. government); Lisa
L. Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-On
Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
299, 323 (2010) (reporting that patent rights to over nine percent of pharmaceuticals
approved by the FDA between 1988 and 2005 are owned in whole or in part by
universities or other public institutions).
330. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006).
331. See Rai, supra note 328, at 109 (noting that "from 1980 to 1992, the number of
patents granted per year to universities increased from fewer than 250 to almost 2,700");
Recent Development, Columbia, Co-Transformation, Commercialization & Controversy:
The Axel Patent Litigation, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 583, 608 (2004) (reporting that
universities were granted more than 3,000 patents in 2000).
332. Notably, there is no evidence that the additional incentive of patent protection
increased the quality or quantity of universities' research output. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE,
supra note 11, at 228 ("[W]e are not aware of anybody claiming, let alone documenting,
that after the Bayh-Dole Act took effect, the quality of biomedical research in U.S.
universities and federal sponsored laboratories visibly increased. It just remained roughly
where it was, meaning that patentability made no difference as far as general incentives
are concerned.").
333. See Lita Nelsen, Ten Things Heads of Institutions Should Know About Setting Up
a Technology Transfer Office, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH
AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION 537, 540 (A. Krattiger et al. eds., 2007) ("[B]efore
subtracting expenses ... , technology licensing and spinout equity income averages less
than 3% of the amount universities spend on research. And the income distribution is
skewed: ten universities in the U.S. (6.3% of the total) account for almost 60% of the total
royalty income...."); Memorandum from Bob Litan & Lesa Mitchell, Kaufman Found.,
to Esther Lee, U.S. Dep't of Commerce 2 (Aug. 17, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review), available at http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=BayhDole
Act&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=4233 ("[T]he majority of
university [technology licensing offices] actually lose money-that is, generate less
licensing revenue for the university than the cost of their operations.").
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Commentators also fail to appreciate that the unpredictable
nature of the biomedical and pharmaceutical arts makes it nearly
impossible for a dominant firm to coordinate future innovation.
Chemistry and physiology are inherently difficult to predict.3?
Accordingly, it is highly implausible that a pioneer in either field
could efficiently orchestrate subsequent innovation. Indeed,
technological advances in both industries are largely the work of
small firms with a narrow focus.335 In such an environment, allowing
dominant firms broad patent rights would likely result in the
destruction of these industries' primary source of innovation.
As in the other industries discussed above, history bears out that
firms holding broad patent rights in the pharmaceutical and biotech
industries have not been good stewards of their patent prospects. The
University of Wisconsin's patent rights covering human embryonic
stem ("hES") cell lines provides one such example. In 1998, Dr.
James Thomson discovered a process to preserve hES cells in nutrient
broth for over a year.336 Thomson, who conducted his research at the
334. See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (applying a higher enablement
bar to patents covering "chemical reactions and physiological activity" because inventions
in these areas generally "involv[e] unpredictable factors"); Golden, supra note 327, at 166
("The unpredictability of biotechnological development makes the coordination of
subsequent invention implausible. ); see also KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 6.9, at 118 (1995) (noting the role of
uncertainty in obviousness determinations).
335. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 11, at 239 (noting that "useful new drugs seem to
come in a growing percentage from small firms, start-ups and university laboratories");
Barnett, supra note 274, at 1010 ("Since ... 1980, biotechnological product development
generally has taken place through collaborative networks that ... match up a small
biotechnology firm, which primarily attends to basic research and early product
development, and a large pharmaceutical firm, which primarily attends to clinical testing,
marketing, and distribution."); Golden, supra note 327, at 167 ("[T]he American
biotechnology industry ... operates according to a 'mayfly' or 'small company' model that
explicitly seeks to unleash hundreds of small, lean (with regard to capital resources), and
largely similar firms to engage, for the duration of their frequently short lives, in a
voracious search for ways of converting bioscience into marketable technology."); Yusing
Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 800
(1992) ("[T]raditional pharmaceutical companies, despite their superior innovative
resources, lag far behind the small start-up companies in contributing to biotechnological
innovations."); Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 271, at 276 (noting that if large pioneer
firms had been awarded broader patent rights "[tihe collection of small and medium sized
firms in the American biotechnology industry ... would not have come into existence").
A recent example of this phenomenon is the pharmaceutical establishment's
reluctance to embrace and develop the field of pharmacogenomics-i.e., "personalized
medicine" or "PGx," she use of a patient's unique genetic makeup to optimize drug
therapy-leaving that task to smaller, leaner firms. See T. Bartfai, Pharmacogenomics in
Drug Development, 4 PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 226,227-28 (2004); Ray, supra note 323.
336. See generally James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from
Human Blastocysts, 282 SCIENCE 1145 (1998) (describing the hES preservation process).
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University of Wisconsin-Madison, a public university,"' credited his
achievement in part to exogenous advances in cell-growth
technology.3 8 Nonetheless, on the basis of Thomson's discovery, the
university was able to obtain patent rights covering embryonic stem
cells themselves-claims so broad they effectively covered all hES cell
lines produced thereafter in the United States, regardless of how they
were produced.3 39
Much in the same fashion that Selden used his patent rights in
the early days of the automobile, the University of Wisconsin has
used its patent rights to extract large royalties from commercial hES
cell researchers.3 4 0 Wisconsin's aggressive attempts to enforce its
337. Though Thomson's research was supported by the University of Wisconsin, see id.
at 1147, it did not receive federal funding, see Rick Weiss, A Crucial Human Cell Isolated,
Multiplied: Embryonic Building Block's Therapeutic Potential Stirs Debate, WASH. POST,
Nov. 6, 1998, at A14.
338. Weiss, supra note 337 ("He credited his success in part to the recent availability of
new nutrient broths that have made it easier to grow human embryos up to about the five-
day mark, when embryonic stem cells can be taken from the embryo's so-called inner cell
mass.").
339. See U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (filed
June 26, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 7,029,913 (filed Oct. 18, 2001); Hazuka, supra note 270, at
174 (noting that the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF") "has interpreted
these claims to apply 'to any cell that is derived from a human embryo and continues to
thrive and multiply without specializing.'" (quoting N. Zeke Campfield, U. Wisconsin:
Stem-Cell Research Places U. Wisconsin in National Spotlight, BADGER HERALD (Aug.
31, 2001), http://badgerherald.com/news/2001/08/30/stem-cell research-p.php)). These
patents are held by WARF, the university's patent-licensing arm. WARF has exclusively
licensed its patent rights for a number of applications to Geron Corporation, which
contributed funding to Thomson's research. See Kathleen Gallagher, Geron to Begin
Clinical Trials for Stem Cell Therapy, MILWAUKEE-WIS. J. SENTINEL (Jan. 23, 2009),
http://www.jsonline.com/business/38222494.html. The PTO granted two public interest
groups' request to reexamine WARF's patents in 2006. See Constance Holden, WARF
Goes 3 for 3 on Patents, SCIENCENOW (Mar. 12, 2008, 12:00 A.M.),
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2008/03/12-04.html?rss=1. All three patents
survived reexamination (with narrowing amendments) in 2008, id., though the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences reversed the confirmation of patentability of one patent
in 2010, see Ex parte Wis. Alumni Research Found., No. 2010-001854, 2010 WL 1734377
(B.P.A.I. 2010).
Initially, WARF's patent monopoly was strengthened even further by President
George W. Bush's decision to limit federal funding to research using cell lines in existence
prior to August 9, 2001. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Gives His Backing for Limited
Research on Existing Stem Cells: No New Embryo Use, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at Al.
The Obama Administration reversed this decision in early 2009. See David Stout &
Gardiner Harris, Obama Reversing Stem Cell Limits Imposed by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2009, at Al.
340. See Gallagher, supra note 339 ("WARF has 30 commercial embryonic stem cell
licensees, and many more in discussion . (internal quotation marks omitted)); Terri
Somers, Foundation's Stem Cell Patents Impede Research, Scientists Say, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 30, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib
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patent rights in the United States-including its insistence that license
agreements include "reach-through" provisions guaranteeing the
university a royalty on any products licensees develop using stem
cells 34 1-has impeded hES cell research in the United States and led
many researchers to leave the country entirely.342
The ongoing battle over Myriad Genetics' ownership of gene
sequences associated with increased risk of breast cancer provides yet
another example. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as many as seven
research teams located in the United States and abroad raced to be
the first to identify and sequence genes associated with hereditary
breast cancerM3 One such team was led by Mark Skolnick at the
University of Utah's Center for Genetic Epidemiology. Skolnick's
team was supported by a mix of federal funding and private
investment in Myriad, a university spin-off created to finance the
team's research.3" In 1994 and 1995, respectively, the Myriad team
successfully isolated two gene sequences (BRCA1 and BRCA2)
carried by women with an increased risk of developing breast and
/20060730/newsln30stems.html ("Under the patents, a researcher in the United States
who uses embryonic stem cells in any way must pay a licensing fee to WARF, the
university's licensing arm."); see also id. ("[C]ommercial biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies must pay. . . licensing fees ... as high as $250,000 ... . [a]nd ...
annual maintenance fees of about $40,000."). WARF also requires licenses for academic
researchers, but charges substantially less. See Kathleen Gallagher, Group Wins Patent
Fight, MILWAUKEE-WIS. J. SENTINEL, Mar. 12, 2008, at D1, available at http://www
.jsonline.comfbusiness/29467229.html ("WARF has 914 academic [stem cell] licensees
. . .. "); Somers, supra ("Originally, WARF charged research institutes $5,000, but that fee
recently was reduced to $500.").
341. See Constance Holden, U.S. Patent Office Casts Doubt on Wisconsin Stem Cell
Patents, 316 SCIENCE 182, 182 (2007); Somers, supra note 340 (describing WARF's "reach-
through royalty clause, where they say anything you've invented remotely by using human
embryonic stem cells will now have a royalty obligation back to WARF" (quoting Joydeep
Goswami, Invitrogen Vice President for Stem Cells and Regenerative Medicine) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
342. See Sandy Kleffman, Stem Cell Research's Newest Foe: Patents, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), at F4 ("[WARF's] patents are impeding our research .... It
is making scientists go overseas to do this sort of research .... It isn't the funding that's
sending us overseas. It's the patent issues." (quoting Jeanne Loring, Director, Stem Cell
Research, Burnham Institute for Medical Research) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Somers, supra note 340 ("In Singapore, Israel, the United Kingdom, Sweden and China,
experts are plowing ahead with this promising science, unfettered by the patents and
supported by government research funding not available in this country. As a result, many
U.S.-based scientists are looking for opportunities to take their work abroad."); Terri
Somers, Stem Cell Patent Ruling Contested, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 19, 2008, at
C3, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20080719/news-lbl9stems.html
("No other country in the world recognizes the WARF stem cell patent.").
343. Gold & Carbone, supra note 319, at S40.
344. Skolnick's University of Utah team received $5 million from the National
Institutes of Health and raised $10 million from sales of Myriad stock. Id. at S41, S64.
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ovarian cancer, narrowly beating out competing researchers.3 45 On
the basis of these discoveries, Myriad won patent rights (shared with
the University of Utah) covering the two gene sequences themselves,
as well as associated mutations and diagnostic tests-claims so broad
that they effectively gave Myriad the right to control all genetic
testing for breast and ovarian cancer.3 46
Much like General Electric a century before, Myriad aggressively
asserted its patent rights to exclude competitors from the genetic
diagnostics market, many of whom hoped to market superior tests. By
the time Myriad began to market its own test for the BRCA genes,
many laboratories were already performing genetic tests for
hereditary breast cancer using alternative methods.3 47 Myriad quickly
sought to eliminate its competition by threatening suit for patent
infringement. In the United States, Myriad sent cease-and-desist
letters to the Genetics and IVF Institute and to the University of
Pennsylvania's Genetics Diagnostic Laboratory, both of which soon
acquiesced to Myriad's demands." Myriad also threatened suit and
trade sanctions abroad in protracted disputes with the national health
care systems of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and
Australia.3 49
While Myriad was focused on excluding competitors,
independent researchers continued to discover new mutations of the
BRCA genes-mutations that were not included in Myriad's tests for
years and which Myriad's patent rights prohibited others from
345. Id. at S41. Another company associated with the University of California at
Berkeley, OncorMed, actually obtained patent rights to one BRCA1 allele before
Myriad's patent covering 47 BRCA1 mutations issued a few months later. Id. Myriad
subsequently purchased OncorMed's patents. Id. In December 1995, Myriad announced
that it had isolated and sequenced BRCA2 and filed a related patent application just one
day before a research team from the United Kingdom published an article containing the
gene's sequence. Id.
346. Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on
Access to Genetic Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast and
Ovarian Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12 GENETICS MED. S15, S15 (2010) (noting that
"Myriad is the sole provider of full-sequence BRCA testing in the United States"); Gold
& Carbone, supra note 319, at S64 ("On paper ... Myriad could effectively block anyone,
including governments and other researchers ... from providing genetic tests for breast
and ovarian cancer .... "). On the basis of its U.S. patent applications, Myriad was also
able to obtain patent rights in Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Gold
& Carbone, supra note 319, at S43.
347. Gold & Carbone, supra note 319, at S64 ("[M]any clinical laboratories had already
developed genetic tests without a patent and others were poised to do so.").
348. Id. at S42.
349. Id. at S43, S51-52 (discussing Myriad's threats of suit and trade sanctions to four
Canadian provinces); id. at S54-57 (discussing Myriad's efforts to enforce its patent rights
in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand).
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marketing in new comprehensive tests.3 50 In some instances, concern
in the research community about the broad scope of Myriad's patent
rights deterred many researchers from sharing newly discovered
mutations with the public or even searching for new mutations in the
first place.35 Worse still, those same fears led many labs to
discontinue testing for the BRCA gene altogether, thereby denying
many patients the benefit of even inferior testing.352
v. Chilling Innovation Across Industries
Though the analysis above does not address each and every
industry, the harm done by broad pioneer patents in the early
markets for steam power, electrical lighting, and, most recently,
biopharmaceuticals strongly suggests that the pioneer doctrine's costs
exceed its benefits regardless of market characteristics. Indeed,
350. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 346, at S16 (noting that as of 2006 "Myriad's
testing strategy ... missed up to 12% of large genomic deletions or duplications"); Gold &
Carbone, supra note 319, at S44-45 (discussing research establishing that many women
had BRCA mutations despite receiving negative test results from Myriad); id. at S55
(discussing the French Institute Curie's objections to Myriad's test, including that "its own
genetic diagnostic test ... was better than that provided by Myriad, especially because it
identified large-scale rearrangements which ... Myriad's test did not find").
351. Gold & Carbone, supra note 319, at S61 ("[R]esearchers, clinical laboratory
directors, commentators, and policymakers ... uniformly agreed that Myriad would
actively pursue any researcher who worked on the BRCA1/BRCA2 genes.... Instead of
more research being done on the two genes, some researchers either stopped working on
them or at least stopped contributing their results to public databases.").
352. Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 6 (2003) (finding that 9 of 122
surveyed U.S. laboratories stopped conducting genetic tests for the BRCA genes due to
fear of infringement litigation with Myriad); see also Gold & Carbone, supra note 319, at
S44 (collecting other studies). Myriad is not the only entity accused of suppressing
improved genetic tests. See SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC'Y,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING
PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 3 (2010),
available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS-patents-report 2010.pdf;
Cho et al., supra, at 8 (identifying patents covering eleven other genetic tests); Merz et al.,
supra note 321, at 578 (finding that twenty-six labs were not performing tests for the
patented HFE gene linked to hereditary haemochromatosis). But see Subhashini
Chandrasekharan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to
Genetic Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, 12 GENETICS MED. S194, S194 (2010) (finding "no
evidence that patents have significantly hindered access to genetic tests for [cystic fibrosis]
or prevented financially cost-effective screening").
The Federal Circuit recently upheld the validity of Myriad's patent claims
covering the isolated BRCA genes themselves, reversing a prior ruling by the Southern
District of New York that isolated human DNA was not patentable subject matter. See
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 2010-1406, 2011
WL 3211513, at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (affirming, however, the invalidity of Myriad's
method claims directed merely to the comparison of gene sequences with the patented
BRCA genes).
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lessons learned from these case studies are by no means as industry
specific as they may appear. The biopharmaceutical industry's
experience with dominant university-backed ventures like Myriad, for
example, is readily translatable to markets for bulk chemicals,
synthetic materials, and semiconductors, all of which rely heavily on
unpatentable scientific advances made in inherently unpredictable
fields.353 Thus it is with a healthy dose of skepticism that we should
view industry-specific calls for generous pioneer protection. History,
after all, shows that dominant pioneers have time after time used
their patent rights to jealously guard market share and monopoly
profits, rather than foster next-generation technology as prospect
theory predicts.
CONCLUSION
The pioneer invention doctrine is of a bygone era. Instituted
more than two hundred years ago in a patent system that virtually no
inventor or patent attorney would recognize today, the pioneer
doctrine is an anachronism in twenty-first century patent law. Before
the advent of patent claims, inventors and courts alike required a
mechanism to determine the outer bounds of patent rights. The
pioneer doctrine fulfilled this need and commendably ensured that
patent rights bore some relation to the importance and novelty of
patented inventions. Now, patent claims play this role and have done
so for more than a century. Early inventors working in new fields are
rewarded with broad claims. Later improvers receive, at best, long
and convoluted claims hemmed in by prior art.
Though courts and commentators have long argued otherwise,
there is no sound reason to believe that the inherent dominance of
pioneer claims is jeopardized by claim-drafting frictions or disparate
treatment at the patent office. Today more so than ever, patent
prosecution pits sophisticated lawyering against an overwhelmed and
understaffed PTO. Thanks to doctrinal advantages like favorable
standards for enablement and reduction to practice, patent law
ensures that applicants disclosing inventions in nascent fields will be
richly rewarded. Combined with the fact that patentees continue to
benefit from reissue and continuation applications, the doctrine of
equivalents, and hindsight bias for years after their patents issue,
there is simply no reason to believe that certain patentees' rights
deserve further expansion.
353. See Kingston, supra note 325, at 217, 220; Merges & Nelson, supra note 28, at 897-
908.
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To the contrary, the history of innovation strongly suggests that
"'pioneer" inventions and "heroic" inventors are nothing more than
modern-day technological mythology.354 A close reading of history
dispels the notion that rare strokes of genius drive innovation.
Unromantic as it may seem, virtually every celebrated invention was
independently made by multiple competitors racing to claim credit
for what was widely regarded as an inevitable result. The surprising
prevalence of multiple invention belies repeated claims by supporters
of the pioneer doctrine that a trove of important discoveries lies in
wait just beyond the innovation-inducing powers of the patent system.
History further suggests that extending broad patent rights to
early inventors in new fields will generally chill, if not entirely freeze,
innovation for years at a time. As the case studies presented above
attest, dominant pioneers have time and again, in industry after
industry, suppressed superior products developed by the next
generation of innovators. From Watt's domination of steam engine
technology at the dawn of the industrial revolution to the University
of Wisconsin's ongoing control over stem cell research today, all
evidence suggests that broad pioneer patent rights fail to encourage
innovation ex ante and, in fact, actually harm innovation ex post.
Nonetheless, all would be well and good if, as conventional
wisdom suggests, the pioneer doctrine were dead letter.
Unfortunately, like popular narratives celebrating heroic inventors,
conventional wisdom with respect to the pioneer doctrine omits much
from the story. While it is true that the pioneer doctrine rarely
appears in published opinions of the Federal Circuit, the doctrine is
far from dead. Patentees frequently raise it, at least as often as several
much-discussed doctrines; courts routinely apply it, especially at the
district court level; and scholars regularly call for its rejuvenation in
misguided attempts to cure any of a host of problems, from economic
stagnation to splintered ownership of the human genome.
Luckily, the solution is straightforward. Rather than allow the
pioneer doctrine to persist in a state of legal limbo, Congress, the
Supreme Court, or the Federal Circuit should once and for all do
away with the doctrine and make clear that no invention, no matter
how purportedly groundbreaking, is eligible for special treatment
354. LAMB & EASTON, supra note 2, at 202 ("Whilst revolutionaries may avail
themselves of scientific discoveries, scientific discoverers are rarely revolutionary. The
picture of a bold scientist venturing into the unknown is a Victorian myth."); HERBERT
ALEXANDER SIMON, MODELS OF DISCOVERY 266 (1977) ("The subject of scientific
discovery ... has always been surrounded by dense mists of romanticism and downright
know-nothingism.").
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under the patent laws."' Such a reform, which merely nudges reality
in line with conventional wisdom, could hardly draw much opposition
or controversy.
This is not to say that every argument made in favor of the
pioneer doctrine is without merit. To be sure, claim drafting is a
difficult practice prone to inadvertent error, and in many industries
fractionalized ownership of patent rights is a significant hurdle to
innovation.3 56 Fortunately, there are numerous alternative solutions
to these problems that do not carry with them a significant risk that
patentees will achieve monopolistic power over an industry. To
improve claim-drafting frictions, a better course of action is simply to
encourage patentees to take full advantage of the tools available to
them at the time of prosecution and shortly thereafter: in particular,
their ability to file multiple claims using words of approximation and
to avail themselves of the neglected reissue mechanism. Similarly, to
reduce the thicket of narrow patent rights clogging certain industries,
one simple and elegant solution is to raise the bar for obviousness.
Such a reform would give early patentees adequate room to breathe
without compromising later competitors' incentives to invest in the
development of legitimate improvements of their own.357
The long history of the pioneer doctrine is a cautionary tale that
implicates the function of appellate courts, the scope of legal
scholarship, and the very principles upon which technology policy is
set. Judicial proclamations abruptly altering long-standing doctrine
must ring with finality, lest antiquated doctrines endure with
unintended consequences. Legal scholarship must also strive to
355. This is very likely what the Federal Circuit panel believed it was doing in Texas
Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Unfortunately, the panel chose to take the easy course and diminish the doctrine's
importance rather than highlight it for further consideration en banc or by the Supreme
Court.
356. Recent scholarship by Christopher Holman, however, casts at least some doubt on
concerns about the purported density of the patent thicket plaguing the biotech industry.
See Christopher M. Holman, Will Gene Patents Impede Whole Genome Sequencing?:
Deconstructing the Myth that Twenty Percent of the Human Genome is Patented 1-2 (Univ.
of Mo., Kan. City Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1894715 (explaining why the oft-cited statistic that twenty
percent of the human genome is patented is merely an "urban legend").
357. See generally Vermont, supra note 93 (arguing that pioneer patents should receive
broader claim scope for purposes of applying the obviousness requirement to competitors'
improvement patents, rather than broader claim scope for purposes of determining
infringement against competitors' products). In fact, as discussed supra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text, the pioneer doctrine was originally created for this purpose in case law
invalidating narrow improvement patents as anticipated by earlier pioneers. See Evans v.
Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 430-35 (1822).
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evaluate more than the latest doctrinal trends. Patent law is, after all,
far more than what happens at the Supreme Court or the Federal
Circuit. Finally, and most importantly, patent policy must not be
dictated by rote reliance on popular notions of invention that have
little basis in reality, among them: that patent rights are always
necessary to encourage exploration of promising but uncertain
innovations, that the most valuable technological contributions of all
are those that break new ground rather than significant
improvements that come later, and that innovation primarily
proceeds through rare leaps made possible by singular strokes of
genius. A patent system designed with heroic inventors and
pioneering inventions in mind will, unfortunately, guide investment in
innovation with the same accuracy as the historical foundation upon
which it rests.
HeinOnline  -- 90 N.C. L. Rev. 459 2011-2012
460 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90
HeinOnline  -- 90 N.C. L. Rev. 460 2011-2012
